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1CHAPTER I
THE EXCHANGE RATE EFFECTS ON THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT: THEORETICAL EVIDENCE
Preface
Exchange rate movements are a fundamental factor in the global economy,
determining the allocation of resources internationally and affecting the
profitability of everyday international transactions. Likewise, exchange rates
influence the allocation of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the profitability of
such investments. Therefore, the relation between the exchange rate and FDI has
been an interesting and important topic to the prior literature.
Previous studies examine various aspects of the relation between the
exchange rate and FDI including exchange rate level, exchange rate volatility,
exchange rate expectations, and the motives behind FDI decisions (See the first
chapter for more). Taken as whole, however, these studies do not show conclusive
evidence for the nature of these relationships. Especially, there is inconclusive
evidence in theory and in empirics for the relation between exchange rate level and
FDI. In this dissertation, I attempt to reconcile these inconsistent observations by
examining the relation between exchange rate level and FDI in terms of different
types of FDI.
2I divide FDI broadly into horizontal FDI and vertical FDI because I postulate
that horizontal FDI and vertical FDI have different implications for the foreign direct
investor's profit. Horizontal FDI implies the exact replica of the foreign direct
investor's home production, so it necessarily involves a foreign currency transaction
that includes both the revenue and the cost of his production aboard. On the other
hand, vertical FDI may involve a foreign currency transaction that includes only the
cost side of his overseas production because vertical FDI is associated with only the
part of the foreign direct investor's home production processes. As a result, while
the exchange rate affects both the revenue and the cost of horizontal FDI, the
exchange rate affects only the cost of vertical FDI.
A simple theoretical model in the first chapter of my dissertation
demonstrates these different implications of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. The
model shows that a deprecation of a host country currency is negatively correlated
with the horizontal FDI investor's profit, while a depreciation of a host country
currency is positively correlated with the vertical FDI investor's profit. This may
suggest that a depreciation of a host country currency depresses horizontal FDI into
that country, while a depreciation of a host country currency promotes vertical FDI
into that county.
The second chapter of my dissertation tests these theoretical predictions of
the first chapter. Controlling for the determinants of FDI identified by the model in
the first chapter, I analyze the relation between bilateral exchange rates and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among 37 countries from 1985 to 2007.
3The results of the analysis reveal considerable support for the model's predictions
in the first chapter that a depreciation of a host country currency depresses
horizontal FDI into that country, whereas a depreciation of a host country currency
promotes vertical FDI into that county. The results also reveal that the exchange
rate effects on different types of FDI can be improved with more careful measures of
horizontal FDI and vertical FDI.
Another consideration regarding the exchange rate effects on different types
of FDI is the role of investor's expectations of the exchange rate. This is because the
expectations of the exchange rate have the exact same effect on the expected foreign
investor's profit as the exchange rate does on the foreign investor's profit. Foreign
direct investors likely need to decide the timing of FDI in relation to the expected
profit generated by engaging in FDI in this period versus future periods. The simple
two-period model in the first chapter exactly illustrates this point. Comparing the
intertemporal foreign direct investor's profit, the model shows that the expectations
of the exchange rate could affect timing of FDI and therefore the ultimate exchange
rate effects on different types of FDI (See the first chapter for more).
The third chapter of my dissertation examines how the expectations of the
exchange rate affect the exchange rate on different types of FDI, and also explores
how robust the expected exchange rate effects on different types of FDI are to the
various measures of the expected exchange rate under different assumptions of
exchange rate expectations: Perfect forecast expectation, adaptive expectation,
rational expectation and risk-adjusted rational expectation.
4Using a similar econometric methodology as in the second chapter, the
analysis reveals that the expected exchange rate effects on different types of FDI are
not robust under the different assumptions of exchange rate expectations and the
expected exchange rate doesn't seem to have significant effects on different types of
FDI either. However, the analysis shows that the expectations of the exchange rate
sheds more light on the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI under all of
the exchange rate expectations. This may imply that the exchange rate is a more
influential determinant of the allocation of different types of FDI than the expected
exchange rate is.
Hopefully, these findings of my dissertation provide new insight into the
relation between the exchange rate and FDI. The specifics and details are explained
in each of the following chapters.
1.1. Introduction
The exchange rate is a price that determines the allocation of resources
internationally. How the exchange rate affects the allocation of foreign direct
investment (FDI) has been studied extensively, but there is inconclusive evidence
for the exchange rate effects on FDI in theory and in empirics. Froot and Stein
(1991), Stevens (1993) and Blonigen (1997) suggest that a depreciation of a host
country currency may increase FDI into that country, whereas Campa (1993),
Tomlin (2000) and Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002) propose that a depreciation of
5a host country currency may decrease FDI into that country. Alternatively, Cushman
(1985) shows that the effects of the exchange rate on FDI may be ambiguous.
However, a careful review of these studies reveals significant differences in
how FDI is modeled and the type of FDI that is assumed. In effect, it is difficult to
find a single study that explicitly models different types of FDL Froot and Stein
(1991) and Blonigen (1997) model FDI as a type of asset-seeking FDL Campa (1993)
and Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002) model FDI as market-seeking FDI, while
Cushman (1985) models different cases of FDI, of which one case is vertical FDI and
another case is similar to horizontal FDI (see section 1.2 for a review).
In terms of a type of FDI, asset-seeking FDI and market-seeking FDI can be
either horizontal FDI or vertical FDL Horizontal FDI is defined as FDI in the exact
same industry abroad as where a foreign direct investor operates in his own
country, while vertical FDI refers to FDI in an industry abroad that is related to the
foreign direct investor's production stages (processes) in his own country (see
section 1.3 for more). So, if a foreign direct investor seeks an asset abroad that is
associated with his home production stages, the asset-seeking FDI is vertical FDI,
but, by contrast, if a foreign direct investor seeks an asset abroad that can duplicate
his entire home production processes, then this asset-seeking FDI is horizontal FDLl
Likewise, when a foreign direct investor seeks a market abroad by engaging
in FDI that duplicates his entire home production processes, this market-seeking
1 In order for foreign investment to be qualified as FDI, the foreign direct investor must have control
over his foreign affiliates.
6FDI is horizontal FDI. Conversely, when a foreign direct investor seeks a market
abroad by engaging in FDI that is associated with his home production stages, this
FDI is vertical FDI. Thus, FDI can be broadly divided into horizontal FDI and vertical
FDI.
Above all, dividing FDI into horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is very useful to
examine the exchange rate effects on FDI because horizontal FDI and vertical FDI
have different implications for the foreign direct investor's profit. Horizontal FDI
implies the exact replica of the foreign direct investor's home production, so it
necessarily involves a foreign currency transaction that includes both the revenue
and the cost of his production abroad. On the other hand, vertical FDI may involve a
foreign currency transaction that includes only the cost side of his overseas
production because vertical FDI is associated with only the part of the foreign direct
investor's home production processes (producing an intermediate input abroad is a
good example of vertical FDI; see section 1.3 for more). As a result, while the
exchange rate affects both the revenue and the cost of horizontal FDI, the exchange
rate affects only the cost of vertical FDI.
So, intuitively, vertical FDI may have the cost saving of utilizing relatively less
expensive factors when a host country currency depreciates. Horizontal FDI,
however, may have the cost saving, along with the revenue loss brought by a
depreciation of a host country currency. This suggests that while a depreciation of a
host country currency may be conducive to vertical FDI into that country, a
depreciation of a host country currency may not be so to horizontal FDI into that
7country if the revenue loss is larger than the cost saving. This very intuition is
demonstrated in extending the model of Aizenman and Marion (2004) (see the
following section for more). I demonstrate that a depreciation of a host country
currency may stimulate vertical FDI into that country, while a depreciation of a host
country may depress horizontal FDI into that country.
Moreover, the expectations of exchange rate movements can also affect the
allocations of FDI because the expectations of the exchange rate affect the future
profit of a foreign direct investor. If the profit generated by engaging in FDI in the
future exceeds the profit generated by engaging in FDI in the present, a foreign
direct investor may postpone his FDI until the future. Otherwise, the foreign direct
investor may bring forward his FDI. Comparing the intertemporal profit in a simple
two-period time frame, I show that there exists a certain level of depreciation of a
host country currency at which a foreign direct investor would delay his FDI. The
analysis also reveals that the threshold of depreciation of a host country currency
for horizontal FDI and vertical FDI differs.
More importantly, the expectations of the exchange rate will shed more light
on the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI because a foreign direct
investor could alter the timing of FDI in light of the expectations of the exchange
rate. If a host country currency is expected to depreciate more than the threshold of
depreciation, a foreign direct investor would postpone his FDI until the future. Then,
this implies that the expectation of the exchange rate may weaken the exchange rate
effects.
8On the contrary, if a host country currency is expected to depreciate less than
the threshold of depreciation (or, appreciate), a foreign direct investor would bring
forward his FDI. In this case, the expectations of the exchange rate may strengthen
the exchange rate effects on FDI. These interesting dynamics of the exchange rate
and the expectations of the exchange rate are analyzed in this chapter, and will be
investigated more thoroughly in later chapters.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly
reviews previous studies of the exchange rate effects on FDI, and section 3 lays out a
theoretical prediction for the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI. Section
4 presents the effect of the expectations of the exchange rate on different types of
FDI. The last section discusses further research agendas and concludes.
1.2. Literature Review
The relation between the exchange rate and FDI has been studied in terms of
exchange rate movements and exchange rate volatility. As an example of studies,
Campa (1993) applies Dixit's option pricing model to examine the effect of the
exchange rate volatility, the exchange rate and the expected exchange rate on FDI.
Campa considers a foreign firm that produces output in its own country and
sells it at a constant market price (in dollars) in the U.S. market. However, the firm
needs to make investment (Le., incur a sunk cost) in order to enter the U.S. market.
Applying the option pricing model to assess this foreign investment, Campa
compares the present value of the firm's expected future profits from entering the
9U.S. market with the firm's cost of entering the market. Based on the comparison,
Campa shows that exchange rate volatility decreases FDI, and both the depreciation
and the expected depreciation of the U.S. dollar decrease FDI. 2,3
To empirically test his claims, Campa constructs a measure of the expected
exchange rate movement under the assumptions of perfect forecast expectation and
static expectation. Under the perfect forecast expectation, the foreign firm is
assumed to have a perfect forecast of the exchange rate for the next 2 years, so that
the realized actual exchange rate in the two years after the firm's entry is used as
the measure of the expected exchange rate. Alternatively, under static expectations,
the firm is assumed to take the exchange rate in the two years prior to the firm's
entry as the expected exchange rate, so the historical exchange rate in the two years
before the firm's entry is used as the estimate of the expected exchange rate.
Additionally, Campa measures the exchange rate volatility by the standard deviation
of the exchange rate.
Examining FDI into the U.S., Campa confirms that a rise in exchange rate
volatility decreases FOI, and the depreciation of the U.S. dollar decreases FDI.
However, his empirical study shows that the expected depreciation of U.S. dollar
2 According to the option pricing model, the value of an option increases with an increase in the
volatility of the underlying asset of the option. So, at any given period, a foreign firm will not exercise
an option to enter the U.S. market and hold it for another period as long as the expected return from
holding the option is greater than the expected return from exercising the option (i.e., the expected
return from serving the U.S. market for that period). When the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar
becomes volatile, the foreign firm will not enter the U.S. market [Le., will not exercise the option)
because the value of the option increases with an increase in the volatility of the exchange rate. As a
result, FDI decreases as the exchange rate become more volatile.
3 Campa denotes the exchange rate in foreign currency per U.S. dollar (Le., a foreign firm's country
currency over a host country currency).
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under perfect forecast expectation has less conclusive effects on FOI, and the
expected depreciation of the U.S. dollar under static expectations has an effect on
the FOI that is not consistent with his theoretical predictions.4 However, Campa
explains that the conflicting effect of the expected exchange rate on FOI may be due
to the fact that a firm cannot correctly predict the exchange rate.
Note that Campa's analysis of the exchange rate effect on FOI directly
contradicts Froot and Stein (1991), and Blonigen (1997). Campa reasons that the
contradiction is attributable to different FOI data. In effect, Froot and Stein (1991)
use the FOI data of manufacturing industries whereas Campa uses the FOI data of
non-manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, Tomlin (2000) shows that Campa's
empirical result may be sensitive to model specification.
Cushman (1985) examines the effects of the exchange rate and the expected
exchange rate on FOI under four cases. Each case is a combination of where to
produce output, where to sell output, and where to finance inputs, especially
capital.s Cushman assumes that a firm needs capital investment in the first period so
that itcan generate profit in the next period (it is a two-period model). In each case,
the firm maximizes the certainty equivalent of the future (the second period) real
4 Campa also examined different samples by each country and by a group of countries, but the results
are not significantly different.
5 Cushman's four cases do not fit the standard definition of FDi very well (See Markusen and Maskus
(2001) for the definition). The 4 cases are: (1) a firm produces and sells output abroad using foreign
inputs with capital financed either at home or abroad; (2) a firm produces and sells output abroad
using imported intermediate goods from home with capital financed only at home; (3) A firm
produces and sells output at home using imported intermediate goods from foreign subsidiaries
whose capital financed at home; and (4) a firm can choose either to produce at home with capital
financed at home to sell abroad, or to produce abroad with capital financed at home to sell abroad.
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profit in the firm's own country currency, and it is assumed that the firm must
estimate the expected exchange rate change in order to maximize the certainty
equivalent.6,7
Based on the profit maximization principle, Cushman shows that the
exchange rate effect on FDI is positive for case 2, but negative for cases 1, 3 and 4,
and the expected exchange rate effect on FDI is positive for cases 1 and 2, but
inconclusive for cases 3 and 4. More specifically, the first order conditions of the
second case, where a firm produces and sells output abroad using imported
intermediate goods from home with capital financed only at home, imply an
appreciation and the expected appreciation of a host country currency increase FDI
into that country because both the appreciation and the expected appreciation
lowers the marginal cost of capital.
To test his theoretical predictions, Cushman constructs a measure of the
expected exchange rate change under the assumption of stabilizing expectations (Le.,
a mean reverting behavior of the exchange rate) and regressive expectations.S
6The certainty equivalent is C == E(rr) - ylTrr , where E(rr) is the expected real profit, y is market price
of risk, and ITrr is the standard deviation of the real profit. That is, the firm is assumed to be risk-
averse.
7 The expected exchange rate change is t/J= E(B) - YlTe, where E(B) is the expected exchange rate
change. y is market price of risk, and lTe is the standard deviation of the exchange rate. Thus, it is the
risk-adjusted expected exchange rate change that the firm estimates. The exchange rate is the price
of a host country currency in terms of the firm's own country currency (Le.. the firm's own country
currency per a host country's currency).
8 Stabilizing expectations and regressive expectations are similar. Under stabilizing expectations a
firm expects the exchange rate to appreciate (depreciate), on average, in the next period if the
exchange rate depreciates (appreciates) in the current period. Under regressive expectations, a firm
expects the exchange rate would converge to a mean value (a long run value) in the future.
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Under both the exchange rate expectation assumptions, he uses the weighted
average of the exchange rate as the estimate of the expected exchange rate.
Analyzing U.S. FDI into five industrialized countries, Cushman reports not
only a statistically significant negative exchange rate effect on the FDI but also a
statistically significant negative effect of the expected exchange rate on the FDI
under both the exchange rate expectations. That is, both depreciation and the
expected depreciation of a host country currency increase FDI into that country.
Unlike the previous two studies, Chen et al. (2006) divide FDI into two
groups: market-oriented FDI and cost-oriented FDI. Interestingly, they investigate
the relation between exchange rate movements and FDI in terms of different
motives behind FDI decisions. Evaluating market-oriented FDI and cost-oriented
FDI with Dixit's real option model, as in Campa (1993), they show that a
depreciation and the expected depreciation of a host country currency have a
negative correlation with market-oriented FDI into that country, whereas a
depreciation and the expected depreciation of a host country currency have a
positive correlation with cost-oriented FDI into that country.
In order to verify their claims, the authors construct a measure of the
expected exchange rate change by means of the exchange rate trend. Examining FDI
into China from Taiwan, they find supportive evidence for their claims that while a
depreciation and the expected depreciation of a host country currency reduce
market-oriented FDI into the country, a depreciation and the expected depreciation
of a host country currency stimulate cost-oriented FDI into the country.
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Like Chen et al. (2006), I too divide FDI into two groups, but I focus on types
of FDI because a different type of FDI has different implications for the foreign
direct investor's profit (see section 1.3 for more). Decomposing FDI into horizontal
FDI and vertical FDI, I examine how the exchange rate affects the allocation of
different types of FDI. I do so by extending the model of Aizenman and Marion
(2004). Since their study is intended to investigate the impact of uncertainty
through productivity shocks, demand shocks and investment risk on horizontal FDI
and vertical FDI, I use their model of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI.
However, while absolute PPP holds in Aizenman and Marion's model, I
depart from absolute PPP because the deviation allows me to extend their model to
incorporate the effects of the exchange rate on different types of FDI. 9 Moreover, the
exchange rate effects are combined with an analysis of exchange rate expectations
on FDI later on. It is my hope that the insight of different types of FDI may
contribute to reconciling the less conclusive evidence for the exchange rate effect on
FDI.
1.3. Exchange Rate Effects on Different Types of FDI
This section presents a simple model to examine the exchange rate effects on
different types of FDI. Consider a world economy with two countries, Home and
Foreign. Each country consumes two final goods, C and Y. The utility of the Home
representative consumer is given by
9 There are many good reasons why absolute PPP does not hold. See Krugman and Obstfeld (2007).
(1) AU(C,Y) = C +8"Yo S.t. C + PyY = m,D < 8 < 1,
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where A and 8 are preference parameters, m is income, and Py is the relative price of
the final good Yin the units of final good C. The price of the good Cis normalized to 1.
The utility maximization conditions yield the demand for final good Y in
Home as
(2) 1Py = AyO- 1 or Y = (A/Py)l-O
Assuming identical preferences for the Foreign representative consumer, the
demand for final good Y in Foreign is
(3) 1Py = A(y*)O-l or Y* = (A/PY)l-O
An asterisk (*) indicates Foreign.
Suppose that the final good C is produced in both Home and Foreign with a
simple production technology,
(4) C = Lc and C* = a*Lc,
15
where Le and L*c is the labor used in producing the good C in Home and Foreign. a*
is the labor productivity in Foreign, and the labor productivity in Home is 1.
Assuming that the labor market in Home and Foreign are perfectly competitive, the
labor productivity implies that the real wage in Home is 1 and the real wage in
Foreign is a*.
Suppose further that the final good Y is produced only by a monopolist
headquartered in Home, and that the monopolist engages in either horizontal FDI or
vertical FDI to produce the good Y. Since final good Y is produced in Home only, the
Foreign demand for the good Y is subject to exchange rate movements. Expressing
the exchange rate (e) as the price of the Home currency in terms of the Foreign
currency, the Foreign demand for the good Y can be written as
(5) 1 1Y* = (Alpy)1-0 = (AIePy)1-0
Given the price of final good Y in the Home currency (Py ), the Foreign demand for
the good Y decreases as the Foreign currency depreciates (Le., e increases), because
final good Y becomes relatively more expensive to the Foreign consumer. The
exchange rate is the real exchange rate because all prices are expressed in the units
of the good C. And, it is assumed that the exchange rate is exogenously given.
The following subsections turns to explaining how the exchange rate
movements affect different types of FDI. It should be noted that the model is
16
abridged in many ways to highlight the exchange rate effects on different types of
FDI.
1.3.1. Horizontal FDI
Horizontal FDI is defined as FDI in the exact same industry abroad as the
foreign direct investor operates in his own country. Specifically, horizontal FDI
implies that a foreign direct investor duplicates its home production abroad and
serves the foreign markets with the duplicated production. 10
In keeping with the definition of horizontal FDI, suppose that the monopolist
headquartered in Home duplicates its Home production of final good Y in Foreign,
so that final good Y is produced in both Home and Foreign. Using a simple Cobb-
Douglas production technology in both countries, the total production of the
monopolist engaging in the horizontal FDI is
(6)
where Ly and L~ are the labor employed in producing final good Y in Home and
Foreign respectively.
As the production in each country serves each market,
(7) Y = jL; and Y* == .fLf
10 I follow Markusen and Maskus (2001) for the definition of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI.
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Then, the profit (rr) of the monopolist denominated in the Home currency is
(8) 1 1rr = Pvy + - p:y* - Lv - - w*Lv,
e e
where w* = a* for easy notation.11. Given the inverse demand for final good Y in
Home (2) and Foreign (3), and the market clearing condition (7), the profit
maximizing level of Yand Y* is12
(9) 1 1Y = (oA/2)2-8 and Y* = (oA/2w*)2-8
It follows that the profit maximizing level of Lv and Lv is
(10) 2 2Iv = (oA/2)2-8 and Iv = (oA/2w*)2-8
Notice that Y* and Iv are not affected by the exchange rate. That is because of the
way horizontal FDI is defined (see equation (7)). The monopolist's profit, however,
is affected by the exchange rate, once it is translated into the Home currency (see
equation (8)).
Based upon the maximized profit, it can be shown that13
11 Recall that the competitive real wage in Foreign is a*, and the competitive real wage in Home is 1.
12 The second order condition with respect to Yconfirms that the profit is maximized.
(11) an
-<0ae
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It means that a depreciation of the Foreign currency (Le., an increase in e) reduces
the profit of the monopolist engaging in horizontal FDI. As the Foreign currency
depreciates, the cost of FDI (the Foreign wage) in the Home currency falls, but at the
same time the revenue in the Home currency falls as well. In this case, however, the
revenue loss is larger than the cost saving. The relatively large revenue loss
associated with the depreciation is attributed to the negative relation between the
monopolist's profit and a depreciation of the Foreign currency.
As a result, the inequality suggests that a depreciation of the host country
currency is correlated with a decrease in horizontal FDI into that country. This
negative effect of the exchange rate on FDI is similar to Campa (1993), Chakrabarti
and Scholnick (2002), and Chen et al. (2006).
1.3.2. Vertical FDI
Vertical FDI refers to FDI in an industry abroad that is related to the foreign
direct investor's production stages (processes) in his own country. As a
representative case, when a foreign direct investor makes a direct investment
abroad so as to produce intermediate inputs, and imports those inputs back for
13 See the appendix for derivation.
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further processing in his own country, the FDI is considered to be vertical FDI (see
Markusen and Maskus (2001) for more).
Following the above case, suppose that the monopolist needs an
intermediate input (M) to produce final good Y. The intermediate input is produced
in Foreign with a Cobb-Douglas production technology given by
(12)
where L~ is the labor employed to produce input M in Foreign, and the input is
imported back to Home for further processing. Suppose also that the monopolist
uses a Leontief production technology in Home to produce final good Y. Then, the
final good is completed by combining intermediate input M with labor in Home.
Accordingly, the final production of the monopolist engaging in vertical FDI is,
(13) Y = min{M,.[L;}
Since vertical FDI implies that final good Y is sold only at Home, the profit (rr) ofthe
monopolist denominated in the Home currency is
(14) w*rr = PyY - Ly - -L'M
e
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Given the inverse demand for final good Y (2), and the production technology (13),
the profit maximizing level of Ly , L'M and Yis found as 14
(15)
(16)
By the envelope theorem, it can be shown that15
aT[
->0ae
The inequality implies that a depreciation of the Foreign currency (Le., an increase
in e) increases the profit of the monopolist engaging in vertical FDI. Intuitively, as
the Foreign currency depreciates, the cost of production (the Foreign wage) in the
Home currency falls, and so the monopolist's profit increases. This implication is a
stark contrast to that of horizontal FDI. When the monopolist engages in horizontal
FDI, there is a negative relation between the monopolist's profit and a depreciation
of the Foreign currency, but now there is a positive relation between them.
The reason for this sign reversal lies behind different types of FDI. Unlike
horizontal FDI, the monopolist engaging in vertical FDI does not serve the Foreign
market. Therefore, there is no revenue loss associated with a depreciation of the
Foreign currency. Only the cost saving induced by the depreciation is a relevant
14 The second order condition with respect to Y confirms the profit maximization.
15 See the appendix for derivation.
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factor in the monopolist's profit in the Home currency. As a result, while a
depreciation of a host country currency may decrease horizontal FDI into that
country, a depreciation of a host country currency may increase vertical FDI into
that country. This positive exchange rate effect on FDI is comparable to Froot and
Stein (1991), Stevens (1993), Blonigen (1997) and Chen et al. (2006).
In summary, equations (11) and (16) show that the exchange rate has
different effects on foreign direct investor's profit when engaging in different types
of FDI. Equation (11) suggests that a depreciation of a host country currency may
depress horizontal FDI into that country, whereas equation (16) suggests that a
depreciation of a host country currency may promote vertical FDI into that country.
1.4. Expected Exchange Rate Effects on Different Types of FDI
This section extends the previous analysis to examine the effects of exchange
rate expectations on different types of FDI. Like the exchange rate level, the
expectations of exchange rate movements can also affect the allocations of FDI
because the expectations affect the future profit of a foreign direct investor. More
interestingly, the expectations of exchange rate movements can influence the
relation between the exchange rate level and different types of FDI.
Suppose that the monopolist headquartered in Home wishes to make vertical
FDI. Considering the positive exchange rate effect on vertical FDI, the monopolist
may wait for a depreciation of the Foreign currency. However, if the monopolist
expects the Foreign currency to depreciate further in the future, he needs to take
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this future depreciation into an account because the future depreciation of the
Foreign currency could increase his future profit. Provided that the future profit is
larger than the profit generated by engaging in vertical FDI in the present, the
monopolist will postpone vertical FDI until the future.
The justification easily applies to horizontal FDI as well. Suppose that the
monopolist wishes to make horizontal FDI, and he expects the Foreign currency to
depreciate further in the future. The monopolist would bring forward his horizontal
FDI if the future depreciation of the Foreign currency reduces the monopolist's
future profit to the extent that it is smaller than the profit generated by engaging in
horizontal FDI in the present.
Evidently, the expectations of the exchange rate affect the exchange rate
effects on FDI because a foreign direct investor can postpone or bring forward his
FDI depending on his expectations of the exchange rate. Therefore, the exchange
rate effects should be modified in light of the expectations of the exchange rate. This
section develops foreign direct investors' timing of FDI associated with the
expectations of exchange rate movements. It examines the relation between the
effects of the exchange rate and the expectations of the exchange rate on different
types of FDI. A simple two-period time frame is considered, and there is no
uncertainty for simplicity.
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1.4.1. Horizontal FDI
Suppose that the monopolist wishes to engage in horizontal FDI, and he
needs to decide the time for engaging in the FDI. Since an investment decision can
be analyzed by comparing profit of the investment (See Cushman (1985), Campa
(1993), and Chen et al. (2006)), I will make use of the monopolist's intertemporal
profit to determine the timing of the FDI.
If the monopolist engages in horizontal FDI, his profit is
(17)
8
(2)8-2 (2 - 8) ( 8)TfH ="6 -8- 1 + e-1(w*)8-2 ,
where TfH denotes the profit generated by engaging in horizontal FDJ.l6 If not, the
monopolist's profit is
where Tf denotes the monopolist's profit without engaging in horizontal FDI. It is
assumed that the monopolist exports final good Y to meet the Foreign demand
without undertaking horizontal FDIP
16 This is obtained by combining equations (8), (9) and (10). Preference parameter A is assumed to
be 1 for simplicity.
17 See the appendix for derivation.
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Suppose now that there is a small one-time fixed cost associated with
horizontal FDI. 18 The monopolist must pay the FDI cost in the Foreign currency at
the time of engaging in FDI, and it is assumed to remain the same over the two
periods. If the monopolist engages in horizontal FDI in the first period, the present
discounted value of the monopolists' profit over the two periods is
(19) H 1 H1[1 + (1 + r) 1[z
k*
where k* is the fixed cost ofthe FDI in the Foreign currency, and r is the real interest
rate. el denotes the real exchange rate in the first period. Instead, if the monopolist
engages in horizontal FDI in the second period, the present discounted value of the
monopolists' profit over the two periods is
(20) 1 k*(1 + r) ez
When the latter (20) is greater than the former (19), the monopolist will
engage in FDI in the second period rather than the first period. More explicitly, if
equation (21) is true, the monopolist will make horizontal FDI in the second period
because postponing FDI is more profitable.
18 The fixed cost of FDI doesn't change the main results of the previous analysis because it doesn't
affect the profit maximizing level of input and output.
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{
H 1 H k*} { 1 H 1 k*}(21) ITl + (1 + r) ITz - e1 < ITl + (1 + r) ITz - (1 + r) ez
Substituting equations (17) and (18) into (21), the expected depreciation of the
Foreign currency at which the monopolist will postpone horizontal FDI is solved for
(22)
where
(1 + r) {k* (2)t; ( O':'l)t; ((2)0':'2 ( O':'l)t; 0)nH = --- - + - 1 + e - 1 + e - -k* el 0 1 0 1 2
_(~/2 (_2~ 0) (1 + el1(W')8~2)}
Equation (22) indicates that if the monopolist expects the Foreign currency to
depreciate by more than nil!, then he will postpone the horizontal FDI and engage
in the FDI in the second period.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that not all the expected depreciation
of the Foreign currency will lead to postponing horizontal FDI. If the monopolist
expects the Foreign currency to depreciate by less than nil1 (but still depreciate),
he would engage in FDI in the first period because postponing the FDI is not more
profitable than making the FDI in the first period.
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As a result, the effect of the expectations of the exchange rate on horizontal
FDI depends on the monopolist's expectations of the exchange rate (above or below
the threshold of fli/), and the relation between the effect of the exchange rate and
the expectations of the exchange rate on horizontal FDI also depend on the
monopolist's expectations of the exchange rate. Specifically, when the expectation of
the exchange rate is greater than the threshold of fli?, this expectation effect may
weaken the exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI because the monopolist could
postpone horizontal FDI. On the other hand, when the expectation of the exchange
rate is less than the threshold of fli/, the expectation effect may strengthen the
exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI because the monopolist could bring forward
his horizontal FDJ.19
In effect, the finding that there is a threshold level of depreciation of a host
country currency at which a foreign direct investor would alter the timing of FDI is
comparable to the study of Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002). Chakrabarti and
Scholnick suggest that a small shock and a large shock of the exchange rate may
matter to FDI activity because a large shock affects foreign investors' expectations of
the exchange rate differently from a small shock. To examine this hypothesis, they
investigate FDI flows from the US to 20 OECD member countries, measuring an
exchange rate shock by the skewness of exchange rate movements, and they find
that a large depreciation of a host country currency may be positively correlated
19 The effects of the expectations of the exchange rate on different types of FDI, and the dynamics
between the effects of the exchange rate and the expectations of the exchange rate will be
investigated more thoroughly in the third chapter.
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with increases in FDI inflow to that country in the near future, but a small
depreciation may not be as correlated with the FDI inflow in the near future as a
large deprecation.
1.4.2. Vertical FDI
Suppose now that the monopolist wishes to engage in vertical FDI and needs
to decide the time for engaging in FDI. As in the case of horizontal FDI, the
monopolist's profit is evaluated first in order to determine the timing of vertical FDI.
When the monopolist engages in vertical FDI, his profit is
(23)
8
nV ~ C~6)(~(1+ :')y-z,
where rrV denotes the profit generated by engaging in vertical FDpo If not, the
monopolist's profit iS21
(24)
20 This is obtained by combining equations (14) and (15). Once again, preference parameter A is
assumed to be 1 for simplicity_
21 See the appendix for derivation.
28
where rr denotes the monopolist's profit without engaging in vertical FOI, in which
case intermediate input M is produced in Home. Using the same Cobb-Douglas
production technology as in equation (12), the monopolist needs to employ twice as
much Home labor as engaging in vertical FOI to produce the final good Y.22
Comparing the monopolist's intertemporal profits as in the case of horizontal
FOI, the left hand side of equation (25) represents the present discounted value of
the monopolists' profit over the two periods when the monopolist engages in
vertical FDI in the first period, and the right hand side represents the present
discounted value of the monopolists' profit over the two periods if vertical FDI is
undertaken in the second period. k* is a small one-time fixed cost involved with
vertical FDI in the Foreign currency.
(25) 1 k* 1 1 k*{rr V + rrv - -} < {rr + rrv - }1 (l + r) 2 el 1 (1 + r) 2 (1 + r) e2
If equation (25) holds, the monopolist will engage in vertical FOI in the second
period.
Substituting equations (23) and (24) into (25), the expected depreciation of
the Foreign currency at which the monopolist would postpone vertical FOI is solved
as
(26)
22 See the appendix for more.
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where
Equation (26) shows that if the monopolist expects the Foreign currency to
depreciate by more than flv\ he would postpone vertical FDI and engage in the FDI
in the second period. Otherwise, the monopolist engages in vertical FDI in the first
period. Therefore, the effect of the expectations of the exchange rate on vertical FDI
depends on the monopolist's expectations of the exchange rate (above or below the
threshold of flV1 ), and the relation between the effects of the exchange rate and the
expectations of the exchange rate on vertical FDI also depend on the monopolist's
expectations of the exchange rate.
Even though the effect of the expectations of the exchange rate on vertical
FDI is exactly the same as the effect on horizontal FDI, equations (22) and (26)
reveal that the threshold for horizontal FDI is not the same as the threshold for
vertical FDI. This implies that the same expectation of the exchange rate could have
different effects on horizontal FDI and vertical FDI.
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1.5. Conclusions
Motivated by mixed evidence for the exchange rate effects on FDI, this
chapter examines how the exchange rate affects the allocation of different types of
FDI. It suggests that the exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI may differ from the
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. It shows that while a depreciation of a host
country currency may depress horizontal FDI into that country, a depreciation of a
host country currency may promote vertical FDI into that country. This chapter also
suggests that the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI are influenced by
the expectations of the exchange rate movements because the expectations of the
exchange rate affect foreign direct investors' timing of FDI. The analysis reveals that
there is a threshold of the expected depreciation of a host country currency at which
a foreign direct investor would alter the timing of FDI, and that the exact threshold
for horizontal FDI and for vertical FDI differs.
Nevertheless, the model developed in this chapter is simple and future work
will extend various features to increase realism. For example, capital is not included
in the production technology. Given that capital is one of the most fundamental
inputs, adding capital may alter the profit maximizing level of labor depending on
the relationship between labor and capital (substitutes or complements). In the case
of substitutes, the cost savings induced by a depreciation of a host country currency
may be not as much as that considered in the mode!. Therefore, it vI/auld be
interesting to see how the exchange rate effects may vary with capital as an
additional input.
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Likewise, production technology would influence the exchange rate effects
on different types of FDI because different production technologies may drastically
change the profit maximizing level of labor through labor productivity. Particularly,
the production technology associated with horizontal FDI and vertical FDI (equation
(7) and (12), respectively) will bring an interesting intricacy to the exchange rate
effects on different types of FDI.
Moreover, a more developed dynamic model will certainly help to examine
the effect of exchange rate expectations on different types of FDI and the relation
between the effects of the exchange rate and the expectations of the exchange rate
on different types of FDI, clarifying the threshold for horizontal FDI and for vertical
FDI.
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CHAPTER II
THE EXCHANGE RATE EFFECTS ON THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ILL Introduction
Motivated by mixed evidence for the exchange rate effects on FDI, the first
chapter examined how the exchange rate affects the allocation of FDI in terms of
different types of FDI. Extending the model of Aizenman and Marion (2004), the first
chapter demonstrated that a depreciation of a host country currency is correlated
with a decrease in horizontal FDI into that country, while a depreciation of a host
country currency is correlated with an increase in vertical FDI into that country.
This second chapter empirically examines how the exchange rate affects the
allocation of different types of FDI. To test the exchange rate effects on different
types of FDI, it is imperative to differentiate horizontal FDI from vertical FDI. Thus,
allowing for the general attributes of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI, 1settle on four
different measures of horizontal FDI and of vertical FDI (See section 11.4), and these
four measures are applied to dividing FDI into horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. The
original FDI data, before the separation, come from Thompson financial M&A data
set. One reason to use this data set is to reflect the recent trend that FDI has been
made in the form of M&A (see section 11.2.1), but a more important reason is that the
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data set is quite disaggregated, allowing one to measure horizontal FDI and vertical
FDI more accurately according to the four different measures of horizontal FDI and
vertical FDI.
With those measures of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI, I construct a
directional country pair (a host country and a home country as a pair) to control for
unobserved country specific characteristics that might affect FDI activity. Then, the
exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is estimated by a Poisson
regression with fixed and random effects, as well as by a negative binomial
regression with fixed and random effects.
The estimation results provide significant support for the model's prediction
in the first chapter. The exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI is indeed different
from vertical FDI. While a deprecation of a host country currency depresses
horizontal FDI into that country, a depreciation of a host country promotes vertical
FDI into that country. Although the results do not show as much evidence for the
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI as horizontal FDI, an additional analysis reveals
that a more careful measure of vertical FDI provides stronger evidence for the
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI.
A comparable study is found in Chen et a1. (2006).23 The authors divide FDI
into market-oriented FDI and cost-oriented FDI by means of different motives
behind the FDI decisions. Although market-oriented FDI is similar to horizontal FDI
and cost-oriented FDI is similar to vertical FDI, both horizontal FDI and vertical FDI
23 See the first chapter for a review of their study.
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can be cost-oriented FDl because horizontal FDl also involves cost savings. In fact,
the authors state that cost-oriented FDl in their sample is horizontal FDl or vertical
FDl. 1, on the other hand, focus on different types of FDl. Of course, how to measure
different types of FDl differ from their way of measuring different motives of FDl,
but their study clearly supports the estimation results in this chapter.24
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the empirical
specification to estimate the exchange rate effects on different types of FDl. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the various measures of horizontal FDl and
vertical FDl. Section 5 puts forward the expected sign of the exchange rate effect on
different types of FDl, and section 6 presents the estimation results. The last section
concludes with suggestions for future work.
11.2. Estimation
The theoretical model in the first chapter reveals important determinants of
the allocation of different types of FDl. It suggests that the exchange rate, the
relative real wage of a host country and a home country, and consumer preferences
in a host country and a home country are significant factors affecting the
allocation.25 Accordingly, the following specification is proposed to estimate the
exchange rate effect on different types of FDl:
24 The authors use industry sales and reverse-import of an industry to measure different motives of
FDI. I use to what extent a country is industrialized and SIC codes to measure different types of FDI.
2S The theoretical model in the first chapter endogenized the profit maximizing level of output and
labor.
(1)
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(
exchange rate, )
FDI activity = f relative real wage,
other controls
The dependent variable of FDI activity is explained by the exchange rate, the
relative real wage of a host and a home country, and other explanatory variables
including year dummies to control for time-related aggregate effects on FDI activity.
Moreover, country pair fixed effects estimation is applied to control for unobserved
country specific characteristics and time-constant factors that might have affected
FDI activity. Provided that consumer preferences don't change over time, the
country pair fixed effects will control for consumer preference differences in a host
country and a home country. The next subsections discuss the variables and
estimation method in detail.
11.2.1. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of FDI activity is measured by the number of M&A
that took place in a host country from home countries in a year, using Thomson's
M&A data. However, two issues need to be resolved in order to use this measure.
First, I need to address whether M&A correctly reflects FDI activity and, second,
whether FDI activity is correctly measured by count data.
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First, I use M&A to measure FDI activity. Although M&A is one of the methods
of establishing FDI, M&A seems to be the most preferred form of FDJ.26 Most of FDI
activity is in the form of M&A, and the volume of M&A in FDI has steadily increased.
For example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) report that over 70% of FDI inflow to Asia
in 1990's was made in the form of M&A.
Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 show a relationship between M&A (count data) and FDI
(flow data in real terms) from 1985 to 2007 for the 7 most industrialized countries
and 7 industrializing countries that have been active participants in FDI (See section
11.3 for M&A and FDI data),27 Graph 2.1 plots inward M&A (M&A inflow to a country)
and inward FDI (FDI inflow to a country) of each country, and graph 2.2 plots
outward M&A (M&A outflow from a country) and outward FDI (FDI outflow from a
country) of each country.
26 FDI can take a form of subsidiary, joint venture, M&A, green-field investment, licensing agreement
and so on. No matter which form it takes, the parent firm must have control over its foreign affiliate
in order for its foreign investment to be qualified as direct investment.
27 The 7 most industrialized countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom
and the United States; 7 industrializing countries are China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines,
South Korea, and Thailand.
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Graph 2.1. Relationship between Inward M&A (dot line) and Inward FDl (solid line).
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Source: M&A count data are constructed from the M&A data taken from Thomson Financial
Securities Data Corporation. FDI flow data are computed using the World Development Indicator. See
section II.3 for more.
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Graph 2.2. Relationship between Outward M&A (dot line) and Outward FDI (solid
line).
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As seen, inward M&A shows a very close relation to inward FDI. Especially
the U.S., the U.K., Canada and South Korea show great similarity between inward
M&A and inward FDI. Outward M&A and outward FDI also appears to share a close
relationship to some extent.
Table 2.1. Correlation between M&A and FDI for the 7 Most Industrialized
Countries.
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Inward 0.78* 0.49* 0.40 0.26 0.56* 0.76* 0.89*
Outward 0.49* -0.15 0.53* 0.15 -0.56* 0.35 0.57*
• indicates statistical significance at the SOlo level.
Table 2.2. Correlation between M&A and FDI for 7 Industrializing Countries.
China Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Philippines S. Korea Thailand
Inward 0.89* -0.13 0.34 -0.43* 0.36 0.90* 0.82*
Outward 0.93* 0.67* 0.05 -0.42* 0.04 -0.2 0.41*
• indicates statistical significance at the SOlo level.
In effect, statistical correlations in tables 2.1 and 2.2 reveal a very interesting
pattern. The correlation between M&A and FDI is higher for inward activity than for
outward activity. Canada, China, South Korea, the U.K. and the U.S. show a
statistically significant and relatively high correlation between inward M&A and
inward FDI, but these countries (except China) do not show the same degree of
correlation between outward M&A and outward FDI. Similarly while Japan shows a
statistically significant, positive correlation between inward M&A and inward FDI, it
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shows a statistically significant, negative correlation between outward M&A and
outward FD1.
Therefore, two things are very clear from the graphs and the statistical
correlations. First, inward M&A reflects overall FDI activity more correctly than
outward M&A over the period of 1985 to 2007. Head and Ries (2008) argue that
M&A reflects FDI activity reasonably well for DECD member countries. Second, each
country exhibits a different pattern of M&A and FD1. Given these two observations,
the use of inward M&A will be more precise in measuring FDI, and it seems to be of
great importance having control for country specific factors affecting FDI activity,
such as geographical and cultural proximity.
Regarding the second issue of whether FDI activity is correctly measured by
count data, admittedly, there is a concern of heterogeneity across investment if M&A
is counted.28 1could measure M&A in monetary units, instead of counting, but more
than 55% of the monetary value of M&A in the sample, Thomson's M&A data set, is
missing (See section 11.3 for more). These missing data make it very difficult to
analyze M&A patterns accurately. As a result, 1am forced to use M&A count data. But,
again, M&A count data reflect FDI flow data reasonably well as graphs 2.1 and 2.2
show. Besides, investment inherently involves a decision of whether to make or not
to make. If so, an investment decision can be treated as an entry decision (whether
to enter or not to enter), as in Campa (1993) and Chen et al., (2006). Thus, if M&A is
28 Testing the exchange rate effects on different types of FOI, using FOI flow data, remains as further
research.
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treated as entry of a foreign direct investor to a host country, counting M&A may be
a reasonable measure of FDI activity after all.
Above all, there is a great advantage of using Thomson's M&A data as the
sample because they are sufficiently disaggregated to allow diViding FDI more
accurately into horizontal FDI and vertical FDI (see section 11.4). These various
measures of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI will help to estimate the exchange rate
effects on different types of FDI with more precision. The next sections explain the
explanatory variables, the estimation methods, the data, and the measures of
different types of FD1.
11.2.2. Explanatory Variables
Annual bilateral real exchange rates are used as the measure of the exchange
rate. The bilateral real exchange rates were computed based on the official annual
exchange rate of a host country and a home country. The official exchange rate of
each country is the nominal exchange rate, so that the real exchange rate is
computed by deflating the official exchange by the GDP deflator of each country. The
real exchange rate is expressed as a host country currency per one unit of the home
country currency in real terms.
Then, the annual real exchange rate is normalized by dividing the exchange
rate by the exchange rate in 1985, so that the exchange rate in 1985 is set to be 1.29
29 This is because the sample period is from 1985 to 2007. For Czech Republic, however, its exchange
rate in 1993 is set to be 1 because the exchange rates from 1985 to 1992 are unavailable.
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This normalization makes the exchange rate unit free. 3D Finally, the normalized
exchange rate is lagged by one year because the FDI decision takes some time. That
is, FOI made this year may be more related to the exchange rate movements in the
previous year than in this year because the actual decision on the FDI might be
made prior to this year.31 In a nutshell, the exchange rate will refer to the unit-free
exchange rate lagged by one year.
The real wage is measured by dividing real GDP by the number of the
employed, applying a rough approximation that the real wage is equal to labor
productivity. Although the approximation is debatable, it is drawn on because it is
very difficult to collect wages for all 37 sample countries over the sample period
from 1985 to 2007. In fact, the approximation is reasonable given evidence that the
real wage and labor productivity tend to move together.32
In computing labor productivity, I use real gross domestic product (GDP)
based on purchasing power parity (PPP). GDP based on PPP is deliberately chosen
because of the concern of high collinearity with exchange rate movements. For
example, when a foreign county's GDP is converted to U.S. dollars for the purpose of
a common measure, the official exchange rate must be used. Then, the converted
GDP necessarily mirrors the movements of the foreign country's exchange rate. This
30 The real exchange rate is not yet in unit-free terms because it is price index that is used in deflating
the nominal exchange rate.
31 See Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002) and Chen et aI, (2006) as example of studies that have used
one year lagged exchange rate.
32 Feldstein (2008) argues that labor productivity tends to move together with the real wage. More so
with total real compensation, when total compensation is deflated by the same price index that is
used in calculating labor productivity. See Feldstein (2008) for more.
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will cause a high correlation between the foreign country's exchange rate and the
converted foreign country's GDP. Therefore, GDP based on PPP that is converted to
constant 2005 international dollars is used in measuring the real GDP in each
country.
After computing the real wage by dividing the real GDP by the number of the
employed for each country, the relative real wage is constructed by dividing the real
wage in a host country by the real wage in a home country. This relative real wage is
also lagged one year because of the time-consuming FDI decision.
In estimating the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI, panel
estimation method is used.33 Thus, time-constant factors are controlled for by fixed
effects or random effects. More specifically, country pair fixed effects estimation is
used to control for unobserved country specific characteristics and other time-
constant factors-geographical and cultural proximity, for example-that might be
related to FDI activity and the explanatory variables. Assuming consumer
preferences do not change over time, country pair fixed effects also control for
consumer preferences in a host country and a home country (see section 11.3 for
country pairs).
In addition to fixed effects, random effects are alternatively examined. A
Hausman test is applied to evaluate whether fixed or random effects are preferred.
Also, I have included year dummies in order to control for time-specific factors,
33 This is tested by a likelihood ratio test. See appendix for the test results.
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other than the explanatory variables, that might have affected FDI activity over the
sample period from 1985 to 2007.
A Poisson regression may be appropriate given the (nonnegative) count
dependent variable. However, simple summary statistics reveal that the variance of
the dependent variable is much larger than the mean (see the fourth row in table
2.3). To accommodate this over-dispersion in the dependent variable, a negative
binomial regression is also considered. Consequently, a negative binominal
regression with fixed and random effects and a Poisson regression with fixed and
random effects, are used to examine the exchange rate effects on different types of
FDI. Moreover, a likelihood test and a-statistics are used to select between a
negative binominal regression and a Poisson regression.34
11.2.3. Distribution
This section briefly reviews the statistical estimation method used in the
analysis. A negative binomial regression assumes that the dependent variable has a
negative binomial distribution (see Greene (2008) for more). The probability
density function is given by
(2) _ _ r(e + Yit) Yit eProb(}jt - YitlXit) - r(Yit + l)r(e) rtt (1- rit) ,
where rit = Aul(Ait + e) .
34 See the appendix for the test results and a-statistics.
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Yit, the dependent variable, is the count variable for the M&A that took place
between matched country pair i in year t, and X it is the vector of the suggested
explanatory variables (see equation (1)) for the country pair i in year t.
The negative binomial distribution has conditional mean, Ait, and conditional
variance, Ait(l + (1/8)Ait), where 8 is a parameter for the distribution. As a
convention, the mean of the (nonnegativeJ count dependent variable, Ait, is
parameterized by the exponential function of the explanatory variables (Xit ) and
the coefficient vector (f3J:
(3J
Then, the coefficient vector, fl, is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood
estimation with fixed and random effects in this chapter (see Greene (2008J for
more).
Interestingly, when (1/8) = 0, the variance is equal to the mean. That is, the
negative binomial distribution becomes a Poisson distribution with mean of Ait.
Because of this, 1/8 is the basis for a-statistics that discriminates between a
negative binomial regression model and a Poisson regression modeJ.35 In the case of
(l/8) = 0, a Poisson regression model estimates the coefficient vector (f3J with
fixed and random effects.
3S a-statistics indicates that a Poisson regression is preferred to a negative binomial regression when
a = (l/B) is not significantly different from zero.
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11.3. Data
The constructed data is a panel data of matched pairs of host country and
home country combinations over the years from 1985 to 2007. The dependent
variable is FDl activity measured by the number of M&A that took place in a host
country from home countries in a year. In order to count the number of M&A, a
matched country pair is constructed from directional M&A in sense that the number
of M&A counts M&A inflow to a country (host country) from other countries (home
countries) .
However, a country pair, itself, does not single out inward M&A (M&A inflow
to a country) or outward M&A (M&A outflow from a country). In order to divide
M&A into inward M&A or outward M&A, the matched country pairs must be sorted
out. Sorting the country pairs by a host country will separate out inward M&A and
sorting country pairs by a home country will separate out outward M&A. As pointed
out earlier, inward M&A should be used to measure FDl activity (See section II.2.1).
Thus, in measuring FDl activity, the matched country pairs are regrouped according
to a host country.
By putting a host country and a home country in a pair, 1065 matched
country pairs have been constructed. Table 2.3 reveals the summary statistics of the
matched country pairs over the entire sample.36 'Pairs' shows that there are 1065
matched country pairs in the entire sample, and the sample period is from 1985 to
36 Sub-samples are considered for the various measures of horizontal FDl and vertical FDl (See the
next section).
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2007. 'M&A' shows that the number of M&A ranges from 0 to 398.37 The mean and
the standard deviation of 'M&A' present the over-dispersion in the variable.
Table 2.3. Summary Statistics of Country Pairs Using the Entire Sample.
Variables
Pairs
Year
M&A
Obs.
23483
23483
23483
Mean
2.937
Std. Dev.
12.644
Min
1
1985
o
Max
1065
2007
398
The M&A data come from Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation
that collects information on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The data set kept
track of all the M&A that took place among more than 210 countries from year 1985
to year 2007, and consist of 401,830 observations over that period. Moreover, the
data set provides detailed information on host countries and home countries; a
parent firm and its foreign affiliate; the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code
of the parent firm and its foreign affiliate; the percentage of shares acquired; and the
date of M&A and the monetary value of M&A. There is a relatively small amount of
missing values except the monetary value of M&A. More than 55% of the monetary
value is missing.
Out of the entire M&A data, I focus only on cross border M&A because my
primary interest is the activity of foreign investment, not domestic investment. So,
cross border M&As are chosen by selecting a host country and a home count!"} that
are different from each other. Among these cross border M&A, I need to choose
37 In 1998 there were 398 M&As into the U.K. from the U.S.
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direct investment, not all investment. Accordingly, I select M&A that involves 10
percent or more voting share because by definition, direct investment involves 10
percent or more voting stocks. After these selections, 312,246 observations are
dropped from the original data set, and now the data set consists of 89,584
observations with 216 host countries and 172 home countries.
Further, I focus on DECD member countries plus industrializing Asian
countries because of the unavailability of the exchange rate of other countries over
the entire sample period. Besides, considering that M&A reflects FDI activity
reasonably well for DE CD member countries, focusing on DECD member countries
would be better for measuring FDI activity. With this concentration, the final sample
includes 69,474 observations with 37 host countries and 37 home countries.38
The data on all of the explanatory variables including FDI data in section
II.2.1 have been collected from the World Development Indicator (WDI) database.
Although the WDI provides very a rich data set, I was not able to collect all the wage
data for the sample countries. Alternatively, I have constructed the relative real
wages, and the constructed wages are based on the WDI data set.
38 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland-Rep, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
-------- ---
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11.4. Measures of Horizontal FDI and Vertical FDI
In order to estimate the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI, it is
very important how horizontal FDI and vertical FDI are measured. However, it is not
easy to divide FDI into horizontal FDI and vertical FDI because most of FDI database
reports FDI data in aggregate forms such as FDI inflows and outflows.39 However,
Thomson's M&A data are disaggregated enough that it allows measuring horizontal
FDI and vertical FDI more accurately.
Table 2.4 shows the various measures of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. The
first measure of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is motivated by the observation that
industrialized countries tend to host horizontal FDI, while industrializing countries
tend to host vertical FDI (see Aizenman and Marion (2004); Hanson et al. (2005);
Glass (2008) and Markusen and Maskus (2001)). Following this observation, the
first measure of horizontal FDI is taken by M&A inflow to the 7 most industrialized
countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States.40 Likewise, the first measure of vertical FDI is taken by M&A inflow to the 7
industrializing countries: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South
Korea, and Thailand.41
39 The FDI statistics by UNCTAD, WDI, IMF and DECD all report FDI data in aggregate forms. UNCTAD
and DECD report FDI data by industry and by region, but they are not disaggregated to the extent
that Thomson's M&A data are.
40 As discussed in the data section, this is done by sorting the matched country pairs by the 7 most
industrialized countries as being a host country.
41 This is constructed by sorting the matched country pairs by the 7 industrializing countries as being
a host country.
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Table 2.4. Measure of Horizontal FDI and Vertical FDI.
Measure
1
2
3
4
Horizontal FDI Vertical FDI
Into industrialized countries Into industrializing countries
Same SIC code Different SIC code
1 and 2 1 and 2
Into industrialized countries from Into industrializing countries from
industrialized countries only industrialized countries only
Note: The 7 most industrialized countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States; 7 industrializing countries are China. Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.
The second measure is chosen according to an implication of horizontal FDI
and vertical FDI. While horizontal FDI means that a foreign direct investor is
operating in the same industry abroad as that where he operates in his own country,
vertical FDI implies that a foreign direct investor is operating in associated
industries abroad in line with its production stages in his own country (see the first
chapter for more). Based on this implication, horizontal FDI is measured by M&A of
which the acquirer and the acquiring are in the same industry (Le., the same SIC
code), and in contrast, vertical FDI is measured by M&A of which the acquirer and
the acquiring are in different industries (Le., different SIC code).
The third measure combines the first and second measure. Specifically, the
third measure of horizontal FDI is taken by M&A inflow to the 7 most industrialized
countries of which the acquirer and the acquiring are in the same industry. In the
same way, the third measure of vertical FDI is measured by M&A inflow to the 7
industrialiZing countries of which the acquirer and the acquiring are in different
industries.
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Finally, the fourth measure of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is taken by
reducing the number of home countries. This measure of horizontal FDI and vertical
FDI is essentially the same as the first measure of horizontal FDI and the vertical FDI.
But the fourth measure considers M&A made only from the 7 most industrialized
countries. That is, horizontal FDI is measured by M&A among the 7 most
industrialized countries (Le., among industrialized countries), and vertical FDI is
measured by M&A inflow to the 7 industrializing countries from the 7 most
industrialized countries (Le., to industrializing countries from industrialized
countries). This measure of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is also supported by
other studies (see Aizenman and Marion (2004); Glass (2008) and Markusen and
Maskus (2001)).
Moreover, the fourth measure of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI serves one
more purpose. It is well known that a negative binomial regression does a better job
without too many zero counts. However, around 61% of FDI activity in the entire
sample is zero account. 51 % of the first measure of horizontal FDI and 70% of the
first measure of vertical FDI are zero accounts. Also, over 60% of horizontal FDI and
vertical FDI measured by the second and third measure are zero counts.42 But, the
zero accounts in the fourth measure are reduced to 12% for horizontal FDI and 50%
for vertical FDI. Interestingly, the empirical results under the fourth measure show
42 More specifically, 71% of the second measure of horizontal FDI and 64% of the second measure of
vertical FDI are zero accounts. And, 60% of the third measure of horizontal FDI and 73% of the third
measure of vertical FDI are zero accounts.
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solid support for the exchange rate effects on horizontal FDI, but not so much for
vertical FDI (See section 11.6 for more).
11.5. Expected Sign of Explanatory Variables
The theoretical model in the first chapter hypothesizes that while a
depreciation of a host country currency is correlated with a decrease in horizontal
FDI into that country, a depreciation of a host country currency is correlated with an
increase in vertical FDI into that country. As a result, the expected sign of the
exchange rate is negative for horizontal FDI, and the expected sign is positive for
vertical FD1.
Table 2.5. Expected Sign of Explanatory Variable.
FDI
Horizontal
Vertical
Explanatory Variables
ER ReI. Wage
+
Moreover, the model also predicts that the relative real wage is correlated
with a decrease in both horizontal FDI and vertical FDI,43 The negative correlation
implies that relatively high wage in a host country will reduce foreign direct
investor's profit, so that both types of FDI are less likely to occur (see Campa (1993),
Chen et al. (2006), Hanson et aI, (2005), Jeon and Rhee (2008)). Therefore, the
expected sign of the relative real wage for both horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is
43 See equations (8) and (14) in the first chapter.
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negative. Table 2.5 provides the expected sign of the exchange rate (ER) and the
relative real wage (ReI. Wage).
As mentioned earlier, one closely related study is Chen et al. (2006). Dividing
FDI into market-oriented FDI and cost-oriented FDI, the authors show a negative
effect of the exchange rate on market-oriented FDI, which is similar to horizontal
FDI, but a positive effect on cost-oriented FDI, which is similar to vertical FDI. The
next sections give details on the empirical results of the analysis.
11.6. Estimation Results
A Poisson regression model with fixed and random effects, and a negative
binominal regression model with fixed and random effects are used to examine the
exchange rate effects on different types of FDI. In order to evaluate each estimation
method, several tests are in place. First, the likelihood ratio test of discriminating
between a pooled regression model and a panel regression model indicates that a
panel regression model is preferred for every single regression that has been
estimated. In effect, this is not really surprising given the patterns of M&A observed
in graphs 2.1 and 2.2.
Second, the likelihood ratio test of discerning between a negative binomial
regression model and a Poisson regression model suggests that a negative binomial
regression model is preferred for all the estimated regressions. Moreover, (X-
statistics also confirms that a negative binomial regression model is preferred. The
estimation results are reported in the following.
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11.6.1. Horizontal FDI
Table 2.6 shows the empirical results on the various measures of horizontal
FDI.44 The negative binomial regression model reveals that the exchange rate (ER)
effect on the horizontal FDI measured by all the measures of horizontal FDI (see
table 2.4) is negative and statistically very significant. These provide strong
evidence supporting the model's prediction in the first chapter that a depreciation of
a host country currency is correlated with a decrease in horizontal FDI. The
coefficient (-0.244) of the exchange rate under the first measure of horizontal FDI
measures that 10% increase in the exchange rate would reduces horizontal FDI by
around 1.4%. Under third measure, the coefficient (-0.597) measures that 10%
increase in the exchange rate would reduces horizontal FDI by about 3.5%.
Moreover, the relative real wage (ReI. Wage) effect on horizontal FDI
measured by all the measures of horizontal FDI is negative and statistically very
significant. There are consistent with the model's prediction in the first chapter that
a relatively high real wage in a host country is correlated with a decrease in
horizontal FDI. Therefore, the empirical results provide strong evidence for the
exchange rate effect and the relative real wage effect on horizontal FDI.
44 The coefficients of year dummies are not reported in the table. See the appendix for the complete
estimation results.
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Table 2.6. The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI.
Measured by (1)
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
-0.482*** -0.478***ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (2)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (3)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (4)
-0.244** -0.241**
(0.076) (0.075)
-0.076*** -0.101***
(0.018) (0.016)
4443 4482
-0.248*** -0.293***
(0.068) (0.062)
-0.050* -0.070***
(0.020) (0.015)
15019 15309
-0.597*** -0.586***
(0.117) (0.113)
-0.086** -0.124***
(0.030) (0.024)
3819 3880
(0.042)
-0.085***
(0.020)
4443
-0.197***
(0.055)
-0.043
(0.022)
15019
-0.489***
(0.082)
-0.093*
(0.039)
3819
(0.041)
-0.114***
(0.018)
4482
-0.237***
(0.051)
-0.063***
(0.016)
15309
-0.492***
(0.080)
-0.134***
(0.026)
3880
ER
ReI. Wage
-0.516*** -0.513***
(0.107) (0.106)
-0.879** -0.781*
(0.334) (0.328)
Number of Obs. 852 852
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI and Vertical FDI
-0.595***
(0.050)
0.119
(0.200)
852
-0.592***
(0.049)
0.151
(0.196)
852
ReI. Wage
ER -0.111* -0.139** -0.196*** -0.204***
(0.045) (0.043) (0.029) (0.029)
-0.035** -0.065*** -0.055*** -0.078***
(0.012) (O.OlD) (0.012) (0.011)
Number of Obs. 18486 18765 18486 18765
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
Although the Poisson regression model provides similar results, the
likelihood ratio test and a-statistics indicate that the negative binomial regression
model is more appropriate than the Poisson regression model (see the appendix for
the complete estimation results including the likelihood ratio test and a-statistics).
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Additionally, the negative binomial regression model based on the overall
FDI (Le., FDI before differentiating horizontal FDI from vertical FDI) reveals the
exact same patterns as the results based on the various measures of horizontal FDI
(see the bottom part of the table). The exchange rate effect on overall FDI is negative
and statistically very significant, and this negative exchange rate effect on FDI is
consistent with Campa (1993), Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002), and Chen et al.
(2006). The relative real wage effect on overall FDI is also negative and statistically
significant. This is consistent with Campa (1993), Chen et al. (2006), Hanson et aI,
(2005), and Jeon and Rhee (2008).
11.6.2. Vertical FDI
Table 2.7 reports the estimation results on the various measures of vertical
FDI. Favored by the likelihood ratio test and a-statistics, the negative binomial
regression model reveals that the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is statistically
insignificant under all of the measures of vertical FDI. Although the random effects
under the second measure of vertical FDI show the exchange rate effect is
statistically significant at the 5% level, a Hausman test indicates that the fixed
effects are preferred.
Furthermore, a negative exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is observed.
Even if it is not statistically significant, the negative effect is directly against the
model's prediction in the first chapter. This unexpected result is quite puzzling.
Perhaps the measures of vertical FDI might not be an accurate measure of vertical
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FDI. Or, M&A inflow might not reflect vertical FDI accurately. Either way, this result
asks for a more careful measure of vertical FDI: An alternative measure of vertical
FDI will be considered later on (see table 2.8).
Table 2.7. The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI.
Measured by (1)
Explanatory
Variables
ER
ReI. Wage
l\lumber of Obs.
Measured by (2)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (3)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Negative Binomial Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
0.006 -0.039 0.01 -0.015
(0.086) (0.082) (0.069) (0.066)
-0.186 -0.279*** 0.254 -0.280**
(0.158) (0.084) (0.185) (0.103)
3089 3203 3089 3203
-0.074 -0.107* -0.179*** -0.186***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.035) (0.033)
-0.031* -0.065*** -0.042** -0.071***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
17368 17663 17368 17663
0.037 -0.021 0.089 0.058
(0.102) (0.095) (0.084) (0.078)
0.052 -0.202* 0.365t -0.213t
(0.240) (0.098) (0.212) (0.123)
2830 2968 2830 2968
ER
ReI. Wage
Measured by (4)
0.147 0.08
(0.125) (0.121)
1.765** 1.265*
(0.662) (0.546)
Number of Obs. 877 877
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI and Vertical FDI
0.264*
(0.105)
5.748***
(0.883)
877
0.236*
(0.101)
3.738***
(0.747)
877
ReI. Wage
ER -0.111* -0.139** -0.196*** -0.204***
(0.045) (0.043) (0.029) (0.029)
-0.035** -0.065*** -0.055*** -0.078***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Number of Obs. 18486 18765 18486 l~/b~
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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The relative real wage effect on vertical FDI measured by all the measures of
vertical FDI is negative, except for the fourth measure of vertical FDI. Although there
are inconsistent wage effects under the third measure of vertical FDI, a Hausman
test prefers the random effects, so that the wage effect is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level. The wage effect under the first measure of vertical FDI is
statistically indeterminate since a Hausman test is unable to tell between the fixed
effects and the random effects, but the wage effect is correctly negative, as expected.
Moreover, the negative wage effect under the second and third measure of vertical
FDI are statistically significant at the 5% level. These may provide sound evidence
for the relative real wage effect on vertical FDI. Nevertheless, the wage effect under
the fourth measure is positive and even statistically significant. This unexpected
result may also call for a more accurate measure of vertical FDI.
Accordingly, while the empirical results do not show much support for the
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI, the negative real wage effect on vertical FDI is
in favor of the model's prediction. The lack of evidence for the exchange rate effect
may call for a more careful measure of vertical FDI once again.
As pointed out in this section, the lack of evidence for the exchange rate
effect on vertical FDI may demand a more accurate measure of vertical FDI. Thus, I
construct an alternative measure of vertical FDI to search for more evidence of the
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. An alternative measure of vertical FDI is
considered by means of excluding Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines from the host
countries of the first measure of vertical FDI. This is because these countries have
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the weakest link between M&A inflow and FOI inflow (see table 2.2). Table 2.8
summarizes the estimation results.
Preferred by the likelihood ratio test and a-statistics, the negative binomial
regression model shows that the sign of each explanatory variable is indeed
consistent with the model's prediction. The exchange rate effect on vertical FOI is
correctly positive, as expected, and even statistically significant at the 10% level.
The coefficient (0.188) of the exchange rate measures that 10% increase in the
exchange rate would increase vertical FOI by about 14%. Note that the 10%
significance level is equivalent to the 5% significance level of a one-tailed test.45
Moreover, a one-tailed test can be well justified given the alternative hypothesis that
a depreciation of a host country currency is correlated with an increase in vertical
FDI.
Table 2.8. The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FOI, Measured by (1) and by
Excluding Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines.
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER
ReI. Wage
0.229+ 0.188t 0.248** 0.227**
(O.121) (O.114) (O.092) (O.087)
-0.087 -0.237* 0.32 -0.245
(O.209) (O.104) (O.222) (O.136)
Number of Obs. 1983 2002 1983 2002
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
45 The significance tests in the estimation are based on a two-tailed test.
60
Also, the relative wage effect on vertical FDI is negative but statistically
significant only under the random effects, but again a Hausman test is unable to
distinguish between the fixed effects and the random effects. These results are by no
means sufficient evidence for the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. However, it
shows that a more careful measure of vertical FDI could expose more evidence for
the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI.
In summary, the estimation results provide strong evidence that a
depreciation of a host country currency is correlated with a decrease in horizontal
FDI into that country, but the results provide weak evidence that a depreciation of a
host country currency is correlated with an increase in vertical FDI into that country.
However, an additional analysis shows that a more careful measure of vertical FDI
may help to reveal more evidence for the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. Also,
the empirical results show that a relatively high real wage in a host country
decreases both horizontal FDI and vertical FDI into that country.
11.7. Conclusion
This chapter provides empirical evidence for the model's prediction in the
first chapter that the exchange rate effects on FDI differ in terms of the types of FDI.
The estimation results suggest that a depreciation of a host country currency may
depress horizontal FDI into that country, as predicted by the first chapter, but the
results do not provide solid evidence that a depreciation of a host country currency
may promote vertical FDI into that country. However, an additional analysis shows
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that a more careful measure of vertical FDl could expose more evidence for the
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. Additionally, the empirical results suggest that a
relatively high real wage in a host country may discourage both horizontal FDl and
vertical FDl into that country, as expected by the first chapter.
In future work, it will be interesting to see how the results hold when FDl
flow data (in monetary unit) are used, instead of FDl count data. Although the FDl
count data in the analyses are very useful to examine the exchange rate effects on
different types of FDl, the count data may not completely resolve heterogeneity in
FDI. Therefore, using FDl flow data may provide more insight into this issue and
may bring more perspective on the exchange rate effect on different types of FDI.
Moreover, as pointed out in the first chapter, the expectations of the
exchange rate will shed more light on the exchange rate effects on different types of
FDl, so it will be interesting to see how controlling for the expectations of the
exchange rate will affect the exchange rate effect on different types of FDI. Perhaps,
exchange rate expectations could bring more evidence for the exchange rate effect
on vertical FDI. This will be investigated further in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
THE EXPECTED EXCHANGE RATE EFFECTS ON THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
111.1. Introduction
The exchange rate is a price that determines the allocation of resources
internationally. How the exchange rate affects the allocation of foreign direct
investment (FDI) is theoretically shown in the first chapter. While a depreciation of
a host country currency decreases horizontal FDI into that country, a depreciation of
a host country currency increases vertical FDI into that country. Moreover,
considerable empirical evidence for these exchange rate effects on different types of
FDI is shown in the second chapter. In this third chapter, the exchange rate effects
on different types of FDI are combined with an analysis of exchange rate expectation
on FDI.
Like the exchange rate level, the expectation of the exchange rate movements
may also affect the allocations of FDI. As demonstrated in a simple two-period time
frame in the first chapter, a foreign direct investor could change the timing of FDI in
light of the expectations of the exchange rate. Depending on a certain level of
depreciation of a host country currency, a foreign direct investor may delay or bring
forward his FDI. If the expected depreciation of a host country currency exceeds the
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threshold of depreciation, a foreign direct investor would make his FOI in the
second period, instead of the first period, because postponing FOI would be more
profitable than making FOI in the first period. If otherwise, the foreign direct
investor would make FOI in the first period because postponing FOI would be less
profitable (see section I1L5 for more).
The above reasoning applies in exactly the same way to both horizontal and
vertical FOI, even though the precise threshold for horizontal FOI differs from the
threshold for vertical FOI, which depends on the value of the parameters given in
the theoretical model (see the first chapter for more).46 A comparable analysis can
be found in the study of Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002). Chakrabarti and
Scholnick suggest that a small shock and a large shock to exchange rate may matter
to FOI activity, and they find that a huge depreciation of a host country currency
may be positively correlated with increases in FOI inflow to that country in the near
future, but a small depreciation of a host country currency may not be all that
correlated with increases in FOI inflow to that country in the near future.
Based on the simple dynamic model in the first chapter, this third chapter
investigates how expectations of exchange rate movements may affect the allocation
of FDL As reviewed in the first chapter, Campa (1993), Cushman (1985) and Chen et
al. (2006) are representative studies regarding the link between the expected
exchange rate and FOI (see the first chapter for details). In brief, Campa (1993)
predicts that the expected depreciation of a host country currency is negatively
46 See the first chapter for the definitions of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI.
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correlated with FDI inflow to that country, but contradictorily, his empirical study
shows a statistically significant, positive relation between the expected depreciation
of a host country currency and the FDI inflow under both assumptions of perfect
forecast expectation and static expectation.
On the other hand, Cushman (1985) shows that the expected depreciation of
a host country currency can be positively or negatively correlated with FDI into that
country. But, his empirical study supports a statistically significant, positive relation
between the expected depreciation of a host country currency and FDI into that
country under both assumptions of stabilizing expectations and regressive
expectations.
Unlike above studies, Chen et al., (2006) divide FDI into two groups: market-
oriented FDI and cost-oriented FDI. Then, it is shown that while there is a negative
relation between the expected depreciation of a host country currency and market-
oriented FDI into that country, there is a positive relation between the expected
depreciation of a host country currency and cost-oriented FDI into that country.
Using the exchange rate trend as a measure of the expected exchange rate, they
show empirical support for their claims.
Additionally, Jeon and Rhee (2002) predict that the expected depreciation of
a host country currency reduces FDI inflow to that country because of a wait-and-
see attitude among foreign direct investors. Their empirical study shows strong
support for their predictions under the assumption of perfect forecast expectations.
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I too divide FDI into two groups, but I focus on different types of FDI:
horizontal FDI and vertical FDL And, it has been shown in the first chapter that
depending on the threshold of depreciation of a host country currency, a relation
between the expected depreciation of a host country currency and horizontal FDI
into that country can be negative or zero, and similarly a relation between the
expected depreciation of a host country currency and vertical FDI into that country
can also be negative or zero. Moreover, I conjecture that the expectation of the
exchange rate sheds more light on the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI
because the expectation of the exchange rate movements would affect the timing of
FDI, as implied by the relation between the expected depreciation of a host country
and FDI into that country (see section IlLS for more).
Accordingly, this chapter explores not only how robust the expected
exchange rate effects on different types of FDI are to the various measures of the
expected exchange rate under different assumptions of exchange rate expectation,
but also how the expectations of the exchange rate affect the exchange rate effects
on different types of FDI in the second chapter. In order to examine these, I use four
different assumptions: perfect forecast expectation, adaptive expectation, rational
expectation and risk-adjusted expectation. Under these exchange rate expectations,
I construct the various measures of the expected exchange rate. These measures of
the expected exchange rate are used for the analysis along with the different
measures of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI in the second chapter.
66
Interestingly, the empirical results show that the expected exchange rate
effects on different types of FDI are not robust under the different assumptions of
exchange rate expectations. In fact, the expected exchange rate doesn't seem to have
significant effects on different types of FDI. However, the expectations of the
exchange rate shed more light on the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI
under all of the exchange rate expectations. This may suggest that the exchange rate
is a more influential determinant of the allocation of different types of FDI than the
expected exchange rate.
This chapter proceeds as follow. The empirical model and the estimation
methods, including dependent variables and explanatory variables, are explained in
the following section. Section 3 discusses the expected signs of the explanatory
variables, and section 4 gives details on the estimation results. The conclusion and
discussion are provided in the final section.
111.2. Estimation
The empirical model in the second chapter can be easily modified to examine
the expected exchange rate effects on different types of FDI. Adding the expected
exchange rate to the previously identified determinants of FDI in the second chapter,
the following empirical model is proposed to estimate the expected exchange rate
effects: 47
47 The exchange rate is the one year lagged exchange rate, as in the second chapter.
(1)
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(
expected exchange rate,)
FDI t ""t f exchange rate,ac LVl Y =
relative real wage,
other controls
The dependent variable of FDI activity is explained by the expected exchange
rate, the exchange rate, the relative real wage of a host and a home country, and
other explanatory variables including year dummies to control for time-related
aggregate effects on FDI activity. Moreover, as in the second chapter, country pair
fixed effects estimation is applied to control for unobserved country specific
characteristics and time-constant factors that might affect FDI activity. The
following sections explain all the variables, the data and the estimation methods.48
111.2.1. Explanatory Variables
The dependent variable and the explanatory variables are the exactly same
as those in the second chapter. And, the data set and the estimation methods are
also the exactly same as in the second chapter. The only exception is the expected
exchange rate. Thus, this section explains the new variable and how to measure it.
Refer to the second chapter for the dependent variable of FDI activity, the exchange
rate, the relative real wage of a host and a home country, the data set, and the
estimation method.
As for the expectations of the exchange rate, there is no simple rule for how
to measure exchange rate expectations. Therefore, four different measures of
48 See the second chapter for the functional form of [C').
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exchange rate expectations are examined: Perfect forecast expectation, adaptive·
expectation, rational expectation, and risk-adjusted rational expectation. Prefect
forecast expectation is frequently used in the previous literature (see Campa (1993)
and Jeon and Rhee (2008), for example), so I simply follow previous studies for
comparison purposes. Adaptive expectation and rational expectation are chosen to
describe more practical views on exchange rate expectation. 49 Adaptive expectation
represents a random walk of the exchange rate, and rational expectation reflects the
uncovered interest parity condition (see Krugman and Obstfeld (2007)).
Although there are many macroeconomic exchange rate models, a random
walk model and the interest parity condition are relatively simple and easy to
implement in forecasting exchange rate movements. Moreover, it has been reported
that a random walk model outperforms sophisticated macroeconomic models in
forecasting exchange rate movements over the short run horizon, roughly in a year.
To create a measure of the perfect forecast expectation, I use the realized real
exchange rate at time t+1 in unit-free terms as the expectations of the exchange rate
at time t+l. The expectation of the exchange rate at time t+l is needed because the
expected time t+1 exchange rate can affect FOI made at time t. According to the
dynamic model in the first chapter, if the exchange rate at time t+1 is expected to
exceed the threshold of depreciation of a host country currency at which a foreign
49 Regressive expectations and stabilizing expectations in Cushman (1985) are less practical than
adaptive expectation and rational expectation for the purpose of this chapter because the mean
reverting behavior of the exchange rate seems to hold for long run exchange rate movements. See
Krugman and Obstfeld (2007), and Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002) for more.
69
direct investor would postpone his FDI, the FDI will be made at time t+1, rather than
time t.
Thus, under the assumption of perfect forecast expectation, FDI made at time
t can be explained by the realized real exchange rate at time t+1 in unit-free terms.
The following specification is proposed to estimate the expected exchange rate
effects on different types of FDI under the perfect forecast expectation.5o
(2) FDI activitYt = f (~xchange rate t+~ ,otherSt_1 )
expected exchange rate
Alternatively, to model the adaptive expectations I use the real exchange rate
at time t in unit-free terms as the expectations of the exchange rate at time t+1 since
adaptive expectations implies that the expectations of the exchange rate depends on
the lagged exchange rate. Thus, FDI at time t can be explained by the real exchange
rate at time t in unit-free terms.51 It follows that under adaptive expectation, the
expected exchange rate effects on different types of FDI is estimated by the
following specification:
(3) FDI activitYt = f ( ~xchange rate ~ otherst_1 )
expected exchange rate
50 Recall that the other explanatory variables are one year lagged because of time-consuming FDI
decision. See the second chapter for more.
51 Time can be blurred in this case. But assume that a foreign direct investor is at time t before
making his FDI.
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A measure of rational expectations is based on the uncovered interest parity
condition, which implies that exchange rate movements are predicted by the
interest rate differential. Equation (4) depicts the uncovered interest parity
condition. 52
(4)
E denotes the price of a home country currency in a host country currency. E£+1 is
the expectation of the exchange rate at time t+1. irost is the host country interest
rate at time t, and irome is the home country interest rate at time t.
Equation (4) suggests that the expected exchange rate change at time t is
predicted by the difference between the host country interest rate and the home
country interest rate at time t. In view of this relation, E£+1 can be obtained
explicitly by solving for E£+l:
(5) Ee - E x (l'host - ihome ) + Et+1 - t t t t
With this result, I normalize the term on the right hand side, following the previous
normalization process, and the nOlTflalized term is used as the expectations of the
52 See Krugman and Obstfeld (2007) for details on rational expectation and the interest parity
condition.
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exchange rate at time t+1. Hence, the empirical specification under the assumption
of rational expectation is suggested by:
(6) FDI activitYt = f (!it X (i~ost - i~ome) + ES' otherSt_1 )
expected exchange rate
Additionally, the interest parity condition assumes a fixed price level because
it is a short run model. 53 Therefore, in order to control for price effects on the
expected exchange rate, the GDP deflator of a host country and of a home country at
time t is included in the specification.
Although the interest parity condition tends to hold under some
circumstances, the interest rate differential is not a good predictor of the expected
exchange rate change in general.54 One explanation of the poor performance is
imperfect asset substitutability: I.e., ignoring relative risk on assets across countries.
Therefore, taking relative risk into account, the interest parity condition can be
modified as:
(7) E
e
-E
t+l t _ ('host 'home) (host home)E
t
- ~t - ~t - Pt - Pt
53 The nominal exchange rate is used in obtaining the expected exchange rate.
54 There is evidence that the covered interest parity holds, but the uncovered interest parity fails to
predict large swings in the exchange rate. See Krugman and Obstfeld (2007) for more.
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where p~ostis risk premium on host country asset at time t and p~omeis risk
premium on home country asset at time t. The second term on the right expresses
relative risk premium of a host country and a home country.
Similar to under rational expectation, solving for E(+1and normalizing the
term on the right hand side in equation (8), I use the normalized term as the
expectations of the exchange rate at time t+1 under the assumption of risk-adjusted
rational expectation.
(8)
Thus, FDI activity is explained by the following specification under risk-adjusted
rational expectation:ss
(9)
FDI activitYt
= f (~t X [(i~ost - i~ome) - (p~ost - p~ome)] + Et,' otherSt_1)
expected exchange rate
To measure interest rates and risk premiums, I have collected data on the
prime (interest) rate and the Treasury bill interest rate. The prime rate is the rate
charged by banks on loans to prime customers, and the Treasury bill interest rate is
the rate at which short term government securities are traded. The prime rate in a
55 The price effect on the expected exchange rate is explicitly controlled for, as in rational
expectations.
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host country and a home country has been used for i~ostand i~ome, and the spread
between the prime rate and the treasury bill rate is used as risk premium since the
treasury bill rate is considered to be risk free. 56 The expected exchange rate in
equation (9) is, therefore, measured by the Treasury bill rate. Table 3.1 summarizes
the measure of the expectation of the exchange rate under the different assumptions
of exchange rate expectation.
Table 3.1. The Measure ofthe Expectations of the Exchange Rate.
Exchange Rate Expectations The Expectation of the Exchange Rate
Prefect Forecast Expectation exchange ratet+1
Adaptive Expectation exchange ratet
Rational Expectation Et x (irost - irome ) + Et
Risk-Adjusted Rational Expectation Et x [(irost - irome ) - (prost - prome )] + Et
Note: The measure of the expectations of the exchange rate is normalized, so that it is expressed in
unit-free terms.
111.3. Expected Sign of Explanatory Variables
The theoretical model in the first chapter hypothesizes that while a
depreciation of a host country currency is correlated with a decrease in horizontal
FDI into the country, a depreciation of a host country currency is correlated with an
increase in vertical FDI into the country. Also, the simple dynamic model in the first
chapter implies that, depending on the threshold of depreciation of a host country
currency, the expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI may be either positive
56 The source of the data is WDI (the World Development Indicator) database.
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or negative, and similarly the expected exchange rate effect on vertical FDI may be
either positive or negative.
Moreover, the expected exchange rate effects on different types of FDI imply
that the expectations of the exchange rate have an effect on the exchange rate effects
because the expectations of the exchange rate movements may affect the timing of
FDI. Particularly, depending on the expectations of the exchange rate, the expected
exchange rate effects on different types of FDI may lessen or enlarge the exchange
rate effects.
As demonstrated in the two-period model in the first chapter, if a host
country currency is expected to depreciate to a certain level, a foreign direct
investor would postpone his FDI until the second period because making the FDI in
the second period will be more profitable than making it in the first period. This part
of the model implies that the expectation of the exchange rate will be able to weaken
the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI. Although the model shows that
there is a threshold level of depreciation of a host country currency that makes
horizontal FDI and vertical FDI more profitable if FDI is postponed, the exact level of
depreciation of a host country currency for horizontal FDI and vertical FDI differs.
On the other hand, not all the expected depreciation of a host country
currency will weaken the exchange rate effects. The expected depreciation below the
threshold level may not cause a foreign direct investor to postpone his FDI. Instead,
it will lead the investor to bring forward his FDI because making his FDI in the first
period will be more profitable than making it in the second period. In this sense, the
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expectations of the exchange rate will be able to strengthen the exchange rate
effects on different types of FDI. As a result, having control for the expectations of
the exchange rate will shed more light on the exchange rate effects on different
types of FDI.
Table 3.2. Expected Sign of Explanatory Variable.
+
0/-
0/-
Exp. ER
~~~~~_Explanatory Variables
ER ReI. WageFDI
Horizontal
Vertical
Table 3.2 provides the expected sign of each explanatory variable. The
expected sign of the expected exchange rate (Exp. ER) can be negative or zero for
both horizontal FDI and vertical FDI because a foreign direct investor may postpone
or bring forward his FDI depending on the expectations of exchange rate
movements. The expected sign of the exchange rate (ER) is negative for horizontal
FDI, while the expected sign is positive for vertical FDI. However, controlling for the
expectation of the exchange rate, the exchange rate effects on both FDI are expected
to be altered (Either weakened or strengthened), compared to the exchange rate
effects in the second chapter, which does not control for the expectations of the
exchange rate.
As a reference, Campa (1993) and Jeon and Rhee (2008) predict that the
expected sign of the expected exchange rate is negative.57 But Cushman (1985)
57 Recall that the exchange rate is expressed as a host country currency per a home country currency.
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shows that the expected sign can be either negative or positive based on 4 cases that
he considered. Chen et al. (2006) expect that the expected sign of the expected
exchange rate is negative for market-oriented FDI, but positive for cost-oriented FDI.
Nonetheless, these theoretical claims are not easily confirmed by their empirical
studies. Campa (1993) reports a statistically significant, positive effect of the
expected exchange rate on FDI, and Cushman (1985) reports a statistically
significant, positive effect of the expectation of the exchange rate. Jeon and Rhee
(2008) and Chen et aI. (2006), however, show some empirical supports for their
claims.58
The expected sign of the relative real wage (ReI. Wage) for both horizontal
FDI and vertical FDI is negative, as the theoretical model in the first chapter shows.
The negative sign implies that relatively high wage in a host country will reduce
foreign direct investor's profit, so that both types of FDI are less likely to occur (See
Campa (1993), Chen et al. (2006), Hanson et al, (2005), Jeon and Rhee (2008)). The
next sections give details on the empirical results of the analyses.
111.4. Estimation Results
As in the second chapter, a Poisson regression model with fixed and random
effects, and a negative binominal regression model with fixed and random effects
are used to examine the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI. Also, the
58 Refer to the second chapter for the expected sign of the exchange rate examined by previous
studies.
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exact same tests as in the previous chapter are in place to evaluate each estimation
method. First, the likelihood ratio test of discriminating between a pooled
regression model and a panel regression model indicates that a panel regression
model is preferred for every single regression that has been estimated. Once again,
this result is not really surprising given the patterns of M&A observed in graphs 2.1
and 2.2.
Second, the likelihood ratio test of discerning between a negative binomial
regression model and a Poisson regression model suggests that a negative binomial
regression model is preferred for all the estimated regressions. In addition, a-
statistics also confirms that a negative binomial regression model is preferred.
However, for the fourth measure of vertical FDI under the assumption of risk-
adjusted rational expectations, a-statistics indicates that a Poisson regression model
does not significantly differ from a negative binomial regression model. In this case,
the negative binomial regression model is considered together with the Poisson
regression modeL More details follow in the subsequent sections.
111.4.1. Perfect Forecast Expectation
Table 3.3 below reports the empirical results on the various measures of
horizontal FDI under the assumption of perfect forecast expectation (PE).59 The
negative binomial regression model reveals that the effect of the expected exchange
S9 The coefficients of year dummies are not reported in the table. See the appendix for the complete
estimation results.
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rate (Exp. ER) on the horizontal FDI measured by the first measure is effectively
zero. It implies that under prefect forecast expectation assumption, the expected
depreciation of a host country currency is smaller than the threshold level of
depreciation at which a foreign direct investor would postpone horizontal FDI, so
that foreign direct investors brought forward horizontal FDI. Although the Poisson
regression model provides similar results, the likelihood ratio test and a-statistics
indicate that the negative binomial regression model is more appropriate than the
Poisson regression model (see the appendix for the complete estimation results
including the likelihood ratio test and a-statistics).
The exchange rate (ER) effect on the horizontal FDI measured by the first
measure is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, it shows
substantial improvement, compared with the exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI
without controlling for the expectations of the exchange rate in the second chapter.
The coefficient (-0.446) measures that 10% increase in the exchange rate would
reduce horizontal FDI by about 2.6%, which is 1.2 percentage point higher than
when the expectations of the exchange rate is not controlled for (see table 2.6).
Similarly, the negative effect of the relative real wage (ReI. Wage) on horizontal FDI
measured by the first measure is significant at the 1% level and also improved,
compared with the wage effect without controlling for the expectation of exchange
rate (See table 2.6).
Table 3.3. The Expected Exchange Rate Effect
Forecast Expectation.
Measured by (1)
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on Horizontal FDI under Perfect
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
0.093 t 0.094 t
(0.049) (0.049)
-0.659*** -0.654***
(0.053) (0.053)
-0.091*** -0.120***
(0.021) (0.019)
4203 4270
Explanatory
Variables
Exp. ER (PE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (2)
Exp. ER (PE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (3)
Exp. ER (PE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (4)
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
0.087 0.072
(0.093) (0.093)
-0.446*** -0.426***
(0.102) (0.101)
-0.080*** -0.106***
(0.018) (0.017)
4203 4270
-0.028 -0.059
(0.082) (0.081)
-0.314*** -0.322***
(0.087) (0.084)
-0.054** -0.075***
(0.021) (0.015)
13997 14601
-0.201 -0.212
(0.139) (0.139)
-0.615*** -0.577***
(0.151) (0.150)
-0.093** -0.132***
(0.031) (0.025)
3623 3696
0.038
(0.065)
-0.306***
(0.069)
-0.053*
(0.023)
13997
-0.024
(0.097)
-0.642***
(0.105)
-0.107**
(0.041)
3623
0.011
(0.064)
-0.327***
(0.066)
-0.070***
(0.016)
14601
-0.028
(0.096)
-0.634***
(0.103)
-0.144***
(0.026)
3696
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (PE) -0.13 -0.128
(0.131) (0.130)
-0.497*** -0.493***
(0.138) (0.137)
-1.184** -1.053**
(0.366) (0.358)
Number of Obs. 810 810
0.018
(0.058)
-0.717***
(0.063)
-0.344
(0.223)
810
0.02
(0.058)
-0.711***
(0.063)
-0.278
(0.218)
810
ER
ReI. Wage
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
Exp. ER (PE) -0.025 -0.050 0.009 0.002
(0.055) (0.054) (0.035) (0.035)
-0.166** -0.171** -0.264*** -0.267***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.037) (0.036)
-0.037** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.080***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Number of Obs. 17317 17909 17317 17909
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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The strengthened exchange rate effect and the strengthened wage effect
clearly illustrate that the expectation of the exchange rate matters. In particular, the
strengthened exchange rate effect can be supportive evidence that the expectation
of the exchange rate shed more light on the exchange rate effect. This revealing
relation is observed repeatedly for the other measures of horizontal FDI.
The negative binomial regression model, preferred by the likelihood ratio
test and a-statistics, also discloses that the expected exchange rate effect on
horizontal FDI measured by the other measures are zero, as predicted by the model.
And, the exchange rate effect under the other three measures of horizontal FDI is
negative and statistically very significant (at the 1% level). The exchange rate effect
is also strengthened.
Similarly, the relative real wage effect on horizontal FDI measured by the
other three measures is negative and statistically very significant. The wage effect is
also strengthened, having controlled for the expectation of the exchange rate.
Especially, the strengthened exchange rate effects confirm once more that the
expectation of the exchange rate has an effect on the exchange rate effect on
horizontal FDI.
Accordingly, the empirical results under perfect forecast expectation
assumption provide the substantial evidence for the exchange rate effect and the
relative real wage effect on horizontal FDL Also; the results show that the
expectations of the exchange rate have an effect on the exchange rate effect on
horizontal FDI.
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Additionally, the negative binomial regression model based on the overall
FDI (I.e., FDI before discriminating between horizontal FDI and vertical FDI) reveals
the exact same patterns as the previous results based on the various measures of
horizontal FDI (see the bottom part ofthe table). The expected exchange rate under
the perfect forecast expectation is zero, and the exchange rate effect on overall FDI
is statistically very significant and negative.6o The relative real wage effect on
overall FDI is negative and very significant. Additionally, the effect of the exchange
rate and relative wage is stronger than those effects without control for the
expectation of the exchange rate examined in the second chapter.
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results on the different measures of vertical
FDI under the assumption of perfect forecast expectation. Favored by the likelihood
ratio test and a-statistics, the negative binomial regression model reveals that the
expected exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is zero under all of the measures.
Although the fixed effects under the first measure of vertical FDI show the expected
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is statistically significant at the 10% level, a
Hausman test favors the random effect under the first measure of vertical FDI. Once
again, the zero effect implies that the expected depreciation of a host country
currency is smaller than the threshold level for vertical FDI.
60 This negative effect of exchange rate on FDI is similar to the empirical results of Campa (1993),
Chakrabarti and Scholnick (2002), and Jean and Rhee (2008). See the second chapter for more.
Table 3.4. The Expected
Forecast Expectation.
Measured by (1)
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Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI under Perfect
Explanatory
Variables
Exp. ER (PE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (2)
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
0.168 t 0.112
(0.102) (0.102)
-0.066 -0.09
(0.101) (0.100)
-0.112 -0.258**
(0.184) (0.085)
2967 3094
Fixed Effects
0.048
(0.078)
0.000
(0.080)
0.303 t
(0.182)
2967
Poisson
Random Effects
0.017
(0.077)
-0.011
(0.078)
-0.264*
(0.105)
3094
Exp. ER (PE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (3)
Exp. ER (PE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (4)
-0.028
(0.062)
-O.l22 t
(0.065)
-0.033*
(0.013)
16306
0.171
(0.119)
-0.038
(0.119)
0.138
(0.238)
2733
-0.054
(0.061)
-0.131*
(0.064)
-0.068***
(0.012)
16859
0.103
(0.118)
-0.071
(0.117)
-0.18i
(0.099)
2867
0.008
(0.041)
-0.235***
(0.043)
-0.043**
(0.013)
16306
0.056
(0.096)
0.078
(0.097)
0.395 t
(0.212)
2733
0.001
(0.041)
-0.236***
(0.043)
-0.073***
(0.012)
16859
0.016
(0.094)
0.063
(0.094)
-0.204t
(0.124)
2867
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (PE)
ER
ReI. Wage
0.189 0.155
(0.151) (0.150)
0.14 0.068
(0.146) (0.146)
3.425*** 2.229***
(0.807) (0.622)
Number of Obs. 843 843
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
Exp. ER (PE) -0.025 -0.050
(0.055) (0.054)
-0.166** -0.171**
(0.057) (0.057)
-0.037** -0.068***
0.131
(0.124)
0.276*
(0.115)
7.892***
(0.964)
843
0.009
(0.035)
-0.264***
(0.037)
-0.057***
0.146
(0.120)
0.248*
(0.114)
5.231***
(0.861)
843
0.002
(0.035)
-0.267***
(0.036)
~O.080***
Number of Obs.
(0.012)
17317
(0.011)
17909
(0.012)
17317
(0.011)
17909
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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The exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is statistically insignificant under all
of the measures of vertical FDI, except for the second measure. The effect of the
exchange rate on vertical FDI measured by the second measure is negative, which is
at odd with the model's prediction. This result is quite puzzling. Perhaps the second
measure of vertical FDI may not be an accurate measure of vertical FDI. Or, M&A
inflow might not reflect vertical FDI accurately. Either way, this result asks for a
more careful measure of vertical FDI: An alternative measure of vertical FDI will be
considered later on (see Table 3.11).
The relative real wage effect on vertical FDI measured by all of the measures
is negative, except for the fourth measure. Moreover, the negative wage effect on
vertical FDI is all statistically significant because a Hausman test prefers the random
effects under the first and the third measure of vertical FDI. Despite that, the wage
effect under the fourth measure of vertical FDI is statistically significant but positive.
This unexpected result also calls for a more accurate measure of vertical FDI.
Under perfect forecast expectation assumption, the expected exchange rate
effect on vertical FDI is zero, but the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is not in
favor of what the model predicts. While support for the negative wage effect on
vertical FDI can be found, the wage effect is not strengthened, compared with the
wage effect without controlling for the expectation of the exchange rate. The lack of
empirical evidence for the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI may call for a more
careful measure of vertical FDI.
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III.4.2. Adaptive Expectation
This section explains the estimation results on the various measures of
horizontal FDI and vertical FDI under the assumption of adaptive expectations.
Table 3.5 below shows the empirical results on horizontal FDI under adaptive
expectation assumption.
Favored by the likelihood test and a-statistics, the negative binomial
regression model reveals that the expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI is
zero. Although the expected exchange rate effect on the first measure of horizontal
FDI is statistically significant at the 10% level, a Hausman test is unable to tell
whether the fixed effects are preferred. In this case, I regard it as inconclusive
evidence.
The negative binomial regression model also reveals that the negative effect
of exchange rate on horizontal FDI is highly significant under all of the measures of
horizontal FDL Moreover, Controlling for the expectation of the exchange rate
strengthens the exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI, except for the fourth
measure of horizontal FDL The exchange rate effect under the fourth measure is
statistically significant and negative, but the effect is actually weaker than the
exchange rate effect without controlling for the expectation of the exchange rate
(see table 2.6).
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Table 3.5. The Expected Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI under Adaptive
Expectation
Measured by (1)
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Exp. ER (AE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (2)
0.223t 0.202
(0.130) (0.130)
-0.440** -0.419**
(0.137) (0.137)
-0.076*** -0.100***
(0.018) (0.016)
4443 4482
0.150* 0.150*
(0.068) (0.068)
-0.609*** -0.605***
(0.071) (0.071)
-0.085*** -0.114***
(0.020) (0.018)
4443 4482
0.244** 0.216*
(0.090) (0.089)
-0.393*** -0.416***
(0.091) (0.090)
-0.043* -0.063***
(0.022) (0.016)
15019 15309
0.21 0.202
(0.133) (0.133)
-0.667*** -0.665***
(0.140) (0.139)
-0.094* -0.134***
(0.039) (0.026)
3819 3880
-0.011 -0.011
(0.082) (0.082)
-0.585*** -0.582***
(0.085) (0.085)
0.121 0.153
(0.201) (0.197)
852 852
0.08 t 0.074
(0.048) (0.048)
-0.261*** -0.265***
(0.049) (0.049)
-0.054*** -0.078***
0.167 0.123
(0.114) (0.114)
-0.381*** -0.396***
(0.115) (0.114)
-0.049* -0.070***
(0.020) (0.015)
15019 15309
0.032 0.01
(0.191) (0.192)
-0.625** -0.595**
(0.202) (0.202)
-0.085** -0.124***
(0.030) (0.024)
3819 3880
ER
ER
ReI. Wage
ReI. Wage
ER
ER
ReI. Wage
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (AE)
Exp. ER (AE)
Exp. ER (AE)
Number of Obs.
Number of Obs.
-0.147 -0.146
(0.181) (0.180)
-0.392* -0.389*
(0.186) (0.186)
-0.871 ** -0.774*
(0.334) (0.327)
Number of Obs. 852 852
Exp. ER (AE) 0.090 0.061
(0.076) (0.076)
-0.184* -0.190*
(0.076) (0.076)
-0.034** -0.064***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Number of Obs. 18486 18765 18486 18765
Measured by (3)
Measured by (4)
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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Similarly, the relative real wage effect on horizontal FDI under all of the
measures of horizontal FDI is statistically significant and negative. However, the
wage effect is not as strong as the wage effect under perfect forecast expectation. In
fact, the wage effect is slightly weaker than the wage effect without controlling for
the expectation of the exchange rate.
The estimation based on overall FDI provides very similar results. The
expected exchange rate effect on overall FDI is zero, and the exchange rate effect on
overall FDI is statistically significant and negative. The relative real wage effect on
overall FDI is also statistically significant and negative. However, while the exchange
rate effect is stronger than the exchange rate effect without controlling for the
expectation of the exchange rate, the wage effect is slightly weaker than the wage
effect without controlling for the expectation of the exchange rate.
To sum up, the empirical evidence shows that the expected exchange rate
effect on horizontal FDI under adaptive expectation assumption is zero, as expected.
The empirical evidence also shows that the negative exchange rate effect and the
negative relative wage effect on horizontal FDI are stronger, controlling for the
expectations of the exchange rate. The strengthened exchange rate effect provides
more evidence that the expectation of the exchange rate have an effect on the
exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI.
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Table 3.6. The
Expectation.
Expected Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI under Adaptive
Measured by (1)
Negative BinomialExplanatory
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Exp. ER (AE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
0.328*
(0.156)
-0.222
(0.139)
-0.172
(0.159)
3089
0.263t
(0.155)
-0.228
(0.140)
-0.268**
(0.084)
3203
0.198t 0.164
(0.115) (0.113)
-0.126 -0.133
(0.106) (0.105)
0.257 -0.273**
(0.185) (0.103)
3089 3203
Measured by (2)
0.023 0.018
(0.057) (0.056)
-0.197*** -0.201***
(0.058) (0.057)
-0.042** -0.071 ***
(0.013) (0.012)
17368 17663
0.093 0.057
(0.138) (0.135)
0.025 0.017
(0.127) (0.125)
0.368t -0.211t
(0.212) (0.123)
2830 2968
0.262 0.261
(0.176) (0.172)
0.099 0.065
(0.153) (0.152)
5.652*** 3.740***
(0.884) (0.740)
877 877
0.109
(0.179)
-0.101
(0.162)
-0.197*
(0.098)
2968
0.019
(0.085)
-0.123
(0.086)
-0.065***
(0.011)
17663
0.175
(0.179)
-0.084
(0.162)
0.064
(0.240)
2830
0.046
(0.085)
-0.112
(0.086)
-0.031 *
(0.013)
17368
ER
ReI. Wage
ER
ER
ReI. Wage
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (AE)
Exp. ER (AE)
Exp. ER (AE)
Number of Obs.
Number of Obs.
0.295 0.257
(0.228) (0.226)
-0.058 -0.104
(0.204) (0.204)
1.859** 1.341*
(0.667) (0.552)
Number of Obs. 877 877
Measured by (3)
Measured by (4)
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (AE) 0.090 0.061 0.08 0.074
(0.076) (0.076) (0.048) (0.048)
-0.184* -0.190* -0.261*** -0.265***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.049) (0.049)
-0.034** -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.078***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Number of Obs. 18486 18765 18486 18765
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.6 reports the estimation results on the various measures of vertical
FDI under adaptive expectation assumption. Preferred by the likelihood test and a-
statistics, the negative binomial regression model uncovers that the expected
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is zero except for the first measure. The random
effects under the first measure of vertical FDI, favored by a Hausman test, show that
the effect of the expected exchange rate on vertical FDI is positive at the 10% leve1.61
However, this positive expected exchange rate effect is not consistent with the
model's prediction. This con11icting result may call for a more careful measure of
vertical FDI once again.
Moreover, the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is not supported by the
results. The negative binomial regression model reveals that under adaptive
expectation assumption the exchange rate effect is statistically insignificant under
all of the measures of vertical FDI. The relative real wage effect, however, is
statistically significant and negative, except for the fourth measure, since a Hausman
test supports the random effects under the first and the third measure of vertical
FDI. And yet, the wage effect has not been improved. Besides, the real wage effect on
vertical FDI measured by the fourth measure is statistically significant and positive,
which is against the model's prediction. This unexpected result also calls attention
to a more accurate measure of vertical FDI.
61 The significance tests in the estimation are based on a two-tailed test, so that a significance test at
the 10% level equals to a one-tailed test at the 5% significance level. Nevertheless the significance
test for the expected exchange rate should be a two-tailed test because the alternative is two-sided.
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It follows that the expected exchange rate effect on vertical FDI under
adaptive expectation assumption seems to be zero, but the exchange rate effect on
vertical FDI is not in favor of the model's prediction. While the relative wage effect
on vertical FDI is consistent with the model's prediction, a more accurate measure
of vertical FDI is necessary to show the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI.
111.4.3. Rational Expectation
This section explains the estimation results under the assumption of rational
expectation. A distinctive finding is that the expected exchange rate effect on
horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is statistically significant and negative, as predicted
by the model. And yet, solid support for the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is
still difficult to find. More details are provided in the following.
Table 3.7 shows the empirical results on the different measures of horizontal
FDI. Favored by the likelihood ratio test and ex-statistics, the negative binomial
regression model discovers that the expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI
under all of the measures of horizontal FDI is zero, except for the second measure.
The expected exchange rate effect under the second measure is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level. This is the first statistically significant
evidence for the expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI.62
62 This negative expected exchange rate on horizontal FDI is similar to Chen et al. (2006). More are
discussed later on.
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Table 3.7. The Expected Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI
Expectation.
under Rational
Measured by (l)
Explanatory
Variables
Exp. ER (RE)
ER
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
-0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.634*** -0.576***
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
0.003 t 0.003 t
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.816*** -0.788***
(0.048) (0.047)
-0.046* -0.090***
(0.020) (0.021)
3600 3710
-0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.296*** -0.329***
(0.063) (0.057)
-0.046 t -0.069***
(0.024) (0.017)
11053 11937
0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.696*** -0.661 ***
(0.093) (0.089)
-0.061 -0.131 ***
(0.039) (0.028)
3067 3193
0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
-1.009*** -1.007***
(0.057) (0.056)
1.311*** 1.326***
(0.253) (0.246)
762 762
(0.088) (0.086)
-0.061 ** -0.100***
(0.020) (0.018)
3600 3710
-0.004* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.344*** -0.365***
(0.076) (0.068)
-0.040t -0.070***
(0.022) (0.016)
11053 11937
-0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
-0.878*** -0.797***
(0.134) (0.127)
-0.062t -0.122***
(0.034) (0.026)
3067 3193
ER
ReI. Wage
ER
ReI. Wage
ReI. Wage
ReI. Wage
ER
Exp. ER (RE)
Exp. ER (RE)
Exp. ER (RE)
Number of Obs.
Number of Obs.
Number of Obs.
-0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
-0.982*** -0.970***
(0.123) (0.121)
0.197 0.281
(0.411) (0.399)
Number of Obs. 762 762
Measured by (2)
Measured by (3)
Measured by (4)
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (RE) -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.217*** -0.219*** -0.358*** -0.348***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.034) (0.032)
-0.029* -0.068*** -0.042*** -0.075***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Number of Obs. 13808 14494 13808 14494
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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The negative expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI implies that
under rational expectation assumption, the expected depreciation of a host country
currency is greater than the threshold level for horizontal FDI, so that foreign direct
investors postponed horizontal FDI. The coefficient (-0.004) measures that 10%
increase in the expected exchange would reduce horizontal FDI by about 0.02%.
The exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI measured by all of the measures
of horizontal FDI under rational expectation is negative and statistically significant
at 1% level. Moreover, the exchange rate effect is much strengthened, compared
with the exchange rate effect without controlling for the expectation of the exchange
rate. For example, the coefficient (-0.634) of the exchange rate under the first
measure implies that 10% increase in the exchange rate would reduce horizontal
FDI by around 2.4%, which is 1 percentage point higher than when the expectations
of the exchange rate is not controlled for. The coefficient (-0.878) under the third
measure of horizontal FDI measures that 10% increase in the exchange rate would
reduce horizontal FDI by about 4.8%, which is 1.3 percentage points higher than the
exchange rate effect without controlling for the expectations of the exchange rate.
The relative real wage effect on horizontal FDI is consistently negative and
statistically significant under the all measures of horizontal FDI, except for the
fourth measure. The wage effect under the fourth measure is incorrectly positive,
but it is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the wage effect under rational
expectation is relatively weaker than the wage effect without control for the
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expectation of the exchange rate. Even so, the negative wage effect on horizontal FDI
is well supported by the estimation results.
In summary, the empirical results under rational expectation assumption
provide sufficient evidence for the exchange rate effect and the relative wage effect
on horizontal FDI. Moreover, unlike the previous two exchange rate expectation
assumptions, a negative expected exchange rare effect on horizontal FDI is observed.
This negative and zero expected exchange rate effects confirm once more that the
expectations of the exchange rate have an effect on the exchange rate effect on
horizontal FDI.
The negative binomial regression model "also reveals that the expected
exchange rate effect on overall FDI is negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level. Again, this is the first statistically significant effect of the expected exchange
rate on overall FDI. This negative expected exchange rate effect on overall FDI is
similar to the empirical result of Jeon and Rhee (2008).63 The exchange rate effect
and the relative wage effect on overall FDI under rational expectation assumption is
similar to those under the previous two assumptions of exchange rate expectations.
The exchange rate effect and the relative wage effect on overall FDI are statistically
significant and negative.
63 Campa (1993) theoretically shows that the negative expected exchange rate effect on FOI, but
empirically shows the positive expected exchange rate effect.
Table 3.8. The
Expectation.
Measured by (1)
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Expected Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDl under Rational
Explanatory
Variables
Exp. ER (RE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (2)
Exp. ER (RE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (3)
Exp. ER (RE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
Measured by (4)
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
-0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.029 -0.039
(0.089) (0.085)
-0.269t -0.355 * * *
(0.159) (0.089)
2680 2845
-0.004* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.201*** -0.206***
(0.057) (0.054)
-0.028 t -0.072***
(0.015) (0.013)
13037 13796
-0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.011 -0.037
(0.107) (0.100)
-0.068 -0.299**
(0.245) (0.102)
2475 2639
Fixed Effects
-0.003 t
(0.002)
-0.053
(0.078)
-0.002
(0.227)
2680
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.361***
(0.040)
-0.031 *
(0.014)
13037
-0.005*
(0.002)
0.003
(0.095)
0.102
(0.258)
2475
Poisson
Random Effects
-0.003+
(0.002)
-0.057
(0.073)
-0.428***
(0.098)
2845
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.345***
(0.038)
-0.070***
(0.013)
13796
-0.005*
(0.002)
-0.013
(0.087)
-0.394***
(0.115)
2639
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (RE) -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
0.213 0.103
(0.131) (0.127)
1.063 0.554
(0.834) (0.657)
Number of Obs. 809 809
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
-0.003
(0.002)
0.269*
(0.112)
3.990***
(1.139)
809
-0.002
(0.002)
0.198 t
(0.109)
1.683*
(0.844)
809
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (RE) -0.004** -0.004** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.217*** -0.219*** -0.358*** -0.348***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.034) (0.032)
-0.029* -0.068*** -0.042*** -0.075***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Number of Obs. 13808 14494 13808 14494
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.8 provides the empirical results on the measures of vertical FDI. The
negative binomial regression model, favored by the likelihood test and a-statistics,
uncovers that the expected exchange rate effect on vertical FDI by all the measures
is zero, except for the second measure. The expected exchange rate effect under the
second measure of vertical FDI is negative and statistically significant at the 5%
level. Interestingly, this is the first statistically significant evidence for the expected
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. The negative effect implies that that the
expected depreciation of a host country currency under rational expectation
assumption is greater than the threshold level for vertical FDI, so that foreign direct
investors postponed vertical FDI.
Nevertheless, the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI under rational
expectation is not consistent with the model's prediction under all of the measures.
Even though the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is positive under the fourth
measure, it is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the relative wage effect on
vertical FDI measured by the fourth measure is incorrectly positive, but it is not
statistically significant either. These unsupportive results may ask for a more careful
measure of vertical FDI over again. The relative real wage effect on vertical FDI
under the other three measures is negative, as predicted by the model. However, the
wage effect under the first and the second measure of vertical FDI is statistically
significant. The wage effect under the third measure is inconclusive since a
Hausman test is unable to tell between the fixed effects and the random effects.
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As a result, the empirical results under rational expectation assumption
provide zero and a negative expected exchange rate effect on vertical FDL However,
it is difficult to examine whether rational expectations have an effect on the
exchange rate effect on vertical FDI because the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI
under rational expectation assumption is not supported by the results. Despite that,
the empirical results provide enough support for the relative wage effect on vertical
FDL
111.4.4. Risk-Adjusted Rational Expectation
As discussed earlier, rational expectation could be a poor assumption
because of imperfect asset substitutability. In order to modify the assumption better,
a risk-adjusted rational expectation measure is considered, having controlled for
imperfect asset substitutability (see section 111.2.1).
Table 3.9 shows the estimation results on the measures of horizontal FDI
under risk-adjusted rational expectations assumption. Favored by the likelihood
ratio test and a-statistics, the negative binomial regression model reveals that the
expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI is effectively zero under all of the
measures, except for the fourth measure of horizontal FDL The expected exchange
rate effect under the fourth measure is negative and statistically significant at the 10%
since a Hausman test favors the random effects. However, the statistical significance
may not be convincing because the relative wage effect is unexpectedly positive.
96
Table 3.9. The Expected Exchange
Adjusted Rational Expectation.
Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI under Risk-
Measured by (1)
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
-0.035*** -0.036***Exp. ER (RRE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
-0.009 -0.007
(0.009) (0.009)
-0.712*** -0.701***
(0.097) (0.095)
-0.497*** -0.717***
(0.121) (0.070)
2494 2575
(0.005)
-0.872***
(0.052)
0.002
(0.154)
2494
(0.005)
-0.841***
(0.051)
-0.735***
(0.091)
2575
Measured by (2)
Exp. ER (RRE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.629***
(0.109)
0.154
(0.119)
5530
0.000
(0.006)
-0.604***
(0.101)
-0.147*
(0.074)
6195
-0.016*
(0.006)
-0.553***
(0.082)
0.265**
(0.093)
5530
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.523***
(0.077)
0.015
(0.071)
6195
Measured by (3)
Exp. ER (RRE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
-0.011
(0.014)
-1.006***
(0.149)
-0.459t
(0.269)
2085
-0.009
(0.014)
-0.958***
(0.140)
-0.777***
(0.111)
2215
-0.033***
(0.010)
-0.743***
(0.100)
0.565*
(0.259)
2085
-0.035***
(0.010)
-0.700***
(0.095)
-0.632***
(0.124)
2215
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (RRE)
Measured by (4)
-0.046***
(0.244)
752
(0.006)
-0.996***
(0.058)
1.311 ***
-0.046***
(0.006)
-0.999***
(0.058)
1.294***
(0.250)
752
-0.02 -0.021t
(0.013) (0.013)
-0.973*** -0.961***
(0.125) (0.124)
0.317 0.404
(0.418) (0.405)
Number of Obs. 752 752
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (RRE) -0.007 -0.007 -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.370*** -0.395*** -0.611*** -0.597***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.043) (0.042)
-0.414*** -0.474*** 0.137 -0.340***
(0.076) (0.049) (0.107) (0.076)
Number of Obs. 6796 7244 6796 7244
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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The exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI is negative and statistically
significant under all of the measures, and all the effects are greatly strengthened
compared to the exchange rate effect without controlling for the expectation of the
exchange rate. The coefficient (-1.006) under the third measure implies that 10%
increase in the exchange rate would reduce horizontal FDI by about 5.6%, which is
2.1% higher than when the expectation of the exchange rate is not controlled for. In
fact, the exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI under risk-adjusted rational
expectation assumption is the strongest among the exchange rate effect on
horizontal FDI considered so far.
The relative real wage effect on horizontal FDI is negative and statistically
significant, except for the fourth measure of horizontal FDI, since a Hausman test
favors the random effects under the second measure. The wage effect is also
strengthened, controlling for the expectations of the exchange rate.
Thus, the empirical results under risk-adjusted rational expectation
assumption provide sufficient evidence supporting the exchange rate effect and the
relative wage effect on horizontal FDI, and shows that the expectation of the
exchange rate has an influence on the exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI.
However the results do not provide the statistically significant evidence for the
expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI.
Similarly, the expected exchange rate effect on overall FDI under risk-
adjusted rational expectation assumption is zero. Given the fact that the expected
exchange rate effect on overall FDI under rational expectation assumption is
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statistically significant and negative, relative risk on assets across countries seem to
play an important role in forming the expectations of the exchange rate. Also, the
exchange rate effect and the relative real wage effect on overall FDI are negative and
highly statistically significant. Moreover, the exchange rate effect and the wage
effect under risk-adjusted rational expectation are greatly improved compared to
the effects without controlling for the expectation of the exchange rate (see table
2.6). The improved exchange rate effect gives more supports to the hypothesis that
the expectations of the exchange rate have an effect on the exchange rate effect on
FDI.
Table 3.10 presents the estimation results on the different measures of
vertical FDI under the assumption of risk-adjusted rational expectation. According
to the negative binomial regression model, the expected exchange rate effect on
vertical FDI measured by the fourth measure only is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level. Although the fixed effects under the first and the third
measure of vertical FDI show that the expected exchange rate effect is significant at
the 10% level, a Hausman test cannot tell that the fixed effects are preferred under
these measures of vertical FDI. The negative expected exchange rate effect on
vertical FDI implies that foreign direct investors postponed vertical FDI in light of
the expected depreciation of a host country currency.
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Table 3.10. The Expected Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI under Risk-Adjusted
Rational Expectation.
Measured by (1)
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Exp. ER (RRE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
-0.038t -0.018
(0.022) (0.020)
-0.118 -0.338t
(0.203) (0.188)
-1.709** -1.044**
(0.525) (0.339)
845 919
-0.046* -0.033t
(0.018) (0.017)
-0.156 -0.360*
(0.184) (0.169)
0.227 -0.674*
(1.156) (0.331)
845 919
Measured by (2)
Exp. ER (RRE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
-0.01
(0.007)
-0.334***
(0.075)
-0.463***
(0.081)
6400
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.354***
(0.073)
-0.482***
(0.053)
6906
-0.017***
(0.004)
-0.629***
(0.051)
0.030
(0.126)
6400
-0.016***
(0.004)
-0.608***
(0.049)
-0.381 ***
(0.083)
6906
Measured by (3)
Exp. ER (RRE)
ER
ReI. Wage
Number of Obs.
-0.04.sr-
(0.025)
-0.197
(0.237)
-1.827***
(0.530)
762
-0.028
(0.023)
-0.39l
(0.211)
-1.285**
(0.432)
851
-0.049*
(0.023)
-0.141
(0.223)
-0.645
(1.383)
762
-0.032
(0.021)
-0.361
(0.198)
-0.892*
(0.431)
851
Measured by (4)
-0.082**
(0.030)
0.173
(0.240)
2.655t
(1.533)
358
-0.104**
(0.032)
0.547*
(0.253)
2.070
(2.592)
348
ER
ER
ReI. Wage
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (RRE) -0.086* -0.068*
(0.035) (0.033)
0.429 0.102
(0.276) (0.257)
-2.394 -0.161
(2.396) (1.505)
Number of Obs. 348 358
-------------------------
Before Discriminating Between Horizontal FDI And Vertical FDI
-----------------~
Exp. ER (RRE) -0.007 -0.007 -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.370*** -0.395*** -0.611*** -0.597***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.043) (0.042)
-0.414*** -0.474*** 0.137 -0.340***
(0.076) (0.049) (0.107) (0.076)
Number of Obs. 6796 7244 6796 7244
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
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The negative binomial regression model reveals that the exchange rate effect
on vertical FDI under risk-adjusted rational expectation assumption is not in favor
of the model's prediction. The exchange rate effect under the second measure is
statistically significant and negative, which is in a direct contradiction to the model's
prediction. Despite lacking support, the empirical results under the fourth measure
of vertical FDI show that the explanatory variables finally have correct sign as
predicted by the model. Moreover, although the relative wage effect under fourth
measure is statistically insignificant, the wage effect on vertical FDI is negative and
statistically significant in general.
Accordingly, the empirical results under risk-adjusted rational expectation
assumption do not give strong support for a negative expected exchange rate effect
and a positive exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. However, the estimation under
the fourth measure of vertical FDI show encouraging results on the exchange rate
effect on vertical FDI. The results provide strong support for a negative wage effect
on vertical FDI in general.
llI.4.5. Searching for the Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI
To this point, there has been strong evidence for the exchange rate effect and
the relative wage effect on horizontal FDI under all of the assumptions of exchange
rate expectations. Also, while considerable support for the relative wage effect on
vertical FDI has been found under different exchange rate expectations, it has been
very difficult to find support for the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI. Therefore,
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this section searches for more concrete evidence for the exchange rate effect on
vertical FDI.
As pointed out earlier, unsupportive evidence for the exchange rate effect on
vertical FDI may ask for a more careful measure of vertical FDI. Thus, an alternative
measure of vertical FDI is considered. As in the second chapter, Indonesia, Malaysia
and Philippines are excluded from the host countries of the first measure of vertical
FDI because these countries present the weakest link between M&A inflow and FDI
inflow (see table 2.2).64 This measure of vertical FDI is put to use under the
assumption of rational expectations because the empirical results under rational
expectation provides the most favorable evidence for the expected exchange rate
effect and the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI.
Table 3.11 summarizes the estimation results. Preferred by the likelihood
ratio test and a-statistics, the negative binomial regression model shows the sign of
each explanatory variable is indeed consistent with the model's predictions. The
expected exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is zero, and the exchange rate effect on
vertical FDI is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the
exchange rate effect is greatly strengthened, compared with the exchange rate effect
on vertical FDI measured by this alternative measure without controlling for the
expectation of the exchange rate (see table 2.8). The coefficient (0.282) measures
10 % increase in the exchange rate would increase FDI by about 22%, which is 8
64 In order to improve estimation results, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines are excluded from the
host countries of the first measure of vertical FDI in the second chapter. This is because these
countries have the weakest link between M&A inflow and FDI inflow. See the second chapter for
more.
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percentage points higher than when the expectation of the exchange rate is not
controlled for.
Table 3.11. The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDl, Measured by (1) and by
Excluding Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines under Rational Expectation.
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER
ReI. Wage
Exp. ER (RE) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 t
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.284* 0.282* 0.141 0.203 t
(0.130) (0.122) (0.114) (0.104)
-0.234 -0.283** -0.186 -0.425***
(0.182) (0.109) (0.329) (0.121)
Number of Obs. 1684 1753 1684 1753
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level. tSignificant at the 10% level.
Additionally, the relative wage effect on vertical FDl is negative but
statistically significant only under the random effects, but a Hausman test cannot
distinguish between the fixed effects and the random effects. Nevertheless, the wage
effect under the fixed and random effects is much strengthened, compared with the
wage effect on vertical FDl measured by this alternative measure without
controlling for the expectation of the exchange rate.65
Again, these results are by no means sufficient evidence for the exchange rate
effect on vertical FDI. However, it shows that a more careful measure of vertical FDI
could expose more concrete evidence for the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI.
6S The estimation results on this alternative measure of vertical FDl under risk-adjusted rational
expectation provides similar results to table 3.11. But the exchange rate effect is statistically
significant only under the fixed effects, but a Hausman test cannot tell between the two effects.
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In summary, the estimation results under all of the assumptions of exchange
rate expectation do not seem to provide a statistically significant effect of exchange
rate expectations on FDI. Although there has been a statistically significant negative
expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI and vertical FDI, the evidence is
weak,66 However, the expectations of the exchange rate shed more light on the
exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. The estimation results under
all of the exchange rate expectation assumptions reports a stronger exchange rate
effect on horizontal FDI than when the expectations of the exchange rate are not
controlled for.
While a positive exchange rate effect on vertical FDI is difficult to find, an
additional analysis shows that a more careful measure of vertical FDI could reveal a
strengthened positive exchange rate effect on vertical FDI, controlling for the
expectations of the exchange rate. As mentioned before, the negative exchange rate
effect on horizontal FDI and the positive exchange rate effect on vertical FDI are
similar to Chen et al. (2006).
These strengthened exchange rate effects are repeatedly observed under the
different exchange rate expectations assumptions. However, the expected exchange
rate effects on different types of FDI are not robust under the different assumptions
of exchange rate expectations. The expected exchange rate effects under perfect
forecast expectation assumption are similar to the effects under adaptive
66 A negative expected exchange rate effect on horizontal FDI and vertical FDI is found under rational
expectation and risk-adjusted rational expectation. While the negative expected exchange rate effect
on horizontal FDI is consistent with Chen et al. (2006), the negative expected exchange rate effect on
vertical FDI directly contradict Chen et aI. (2006).
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expectation, and the expected exchange rate effects under rational expectation
assumption are similar to those under risk-adjusted rational expectation
assumption. In fact, the expected exchange rate doesn't seem to have significant
effects on different types of FDI. This suggests that the exchange rate is a more
influential determinant of the allocation of different types of FDI than the expected
exchange rate.
The negative effect of the relative real wage on horizontal FDI and vertical
FDI is strongly supported by the estimation results under all of the exchange rate
expectations assumptions. This negative wage effect is consistent with Campa
(1993), Chen et al. (2006), and Hanson et al. (2005).
111.5. Conclusions
This chapter examines the expected exchange rate effect on different types of
FDI-horizontal FDI and vertical FDI-under the various assumptions of exchange
rate expectations: Perfect forecast expectation, adaptive expectation, rational
expectation and risk-adjusted rational expectation. The empirical results suggest
that, although the expectations of the exchange rate under all of the exchange rate
expectations sheds more light on the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI,
the expected exchange rate effects on different types of FDI are not robust under the
different assumptions of exchange rate expectations. In fact, the expected exchange
rate does not seem to have significant effects on different types of FDI. This suggests
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that the exchange rate is a more influential determinant of the allocation of different
types of FDI than the expected exchange rate.
Although the exchange rate effect on vertical FDI can be improved by a more
careful measure of vertical FDI, actual real wages of a host and home country and
alternative measures of FDI activity, instead of M&A, can also be useful to improve
the estimation results.
For further research, more theoretical and empirical studies on the expected
exchange rate effects on different types of FDI may be required because it is unclear
what is the exact level of a depreciation of a host country currency for horizontal
FDI and for vertical FDI, at which a foreign direct investor would postpone his FDI,
and how the threshold of the depreciation is determined. More research on the
threshold of the depreciation will be able to clarify the expected exchange rate
effects, and therefore the exchange rate effects on different types of FDI.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS IN CHAPTER I
This appendix shows the derivation of equations (11) and (16) in section 3,
and equations (18) and (24) in section 4.
Derivation of Equation (11)
Given the inverse demand for final good Y in equations (2) and (3), and the
production technology in equation (7), the maximized profit in equation (8) can be
written as
Ai.
Differentiating with respect to the real exchange rate (e) gives
A2.
Substituting equation (9),
arr A - 8 w* - 2
- = --Y* +-Y*
ae e2 e2
A3.
8 2
arr = _~( SA )2-8 + w* (SA )2-8
ae e 2 2w* e 2 2w*
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By collecting terms and simplifying,
A4.
o
Bn 1 (OA )Z-O [(0 - 2)A]. < 1
- = - -- < 0 SInce 0 < 0Be eZ 2w* 2 '
Thus, equation (11) is obtained.
Derivation of Equation (16)
Given the inverse demand for final good Y in equation (2) and the production
technology in equations (12) and (13), the maximized profit in equation (14) can be
written as
AS. n = AYo _ yZ_ w* yZ
e
Differentiating with respect to the real exchange rate (e) yields
A6. Bn -0 1 (BY) - (BY) w* -z w* [ - (BY)]= DAY - - - 2Y - +-Y -- 2Y -Be Be Be e Z e Be
By the envelope theorem,
A7. Bn w*-z
-=-Y>OBe e Z
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Thus, equation (16) is found.
Derivation of Equation (18)
Without engaging in horizontal FDl, it is assumed that the monopolist
exports final good Y to Foreign. Then, the market clearing condition becomes
A8. Y + Y* = J4
And, the monopolist's profit (rr) in the Home currency becomes,
A9. 1rr = Py Y + - P~Y* - Ly
e
It follows that the profit maximization, subject to equation (A8.) and the inverse
demand for final good Y in equations (2) and (3), yields the following equations.
A10.
All.
A12.
Y + Y* == (~) y 8 - 1
1
_ 1( 1)8-2 _ (1) _Y == (0/2)2-8 1 + e8- 1 and Y* == e8-1 Y
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Using equation (A8), (All) and (A12), the profit maximizing level of Lyis
A13.
28-2
_ 2 ( 1 )7P2L y = (0/2)2-8 1 + e 8- 1
By substituting (A12) and (A13) into (A9) and simplifying, equation (18) is
obtained.
Derivation of Equation (24)
Without engaging in vertical FDI, the monopolist needs to produce
intermediate input M in Home. Then, equation (12) of the production of the
intermediate input is replaced by
A14. M = j4r,
where LM is the labor employed to produce the input M in Home. It follows that the
monopolist's profit is
A1S. rr = Py Y - Ly - LM
Subject to the inverse demand for final good Y (2) and the production technology of
the good Y (13), the profit maximization yields that the profit maximizing level of y,
Ly , and Ly is
A16.
1
- - -2 - (4)8-2Ly = LM = Y ,and Y = "8
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By substituting (A16) into (A1S), equation (24) is found.
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APPENDIXB
ESTIMATION RESULTS IN CHAPTER II
This appendix provides the complete estimation results on the exchange rate
effect on the different types of FDI.
The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FOI, Measured by (1).
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER -0.244** -0.241 ** -0.482*** -0.478***
(0.076) (0.075) (0.042) (0.041)
ReI. Wage -0.076*** -0.101*** -0.085*** -0.114***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018)
1986 0.769*** 0.782*** -0.774*** 1.352***
(0.160) (0.159) (0.065) (0.131)
1987 1.155*** 1.168*** -0.466*** 1.660***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.059) (0.129)
1988 1.624*** 1.635*** 2.126***
(0.138) (0.137) (0.126)
1989 2.027*** 2.038*** 0.343*** 2.468***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.048) (0.125)
1990 2.140*** 2.152*** 0.417*** 2.543***
(0.127) (0.126) (0.048) (0.125)
1991 2.091*** 2.103*** 0.290*** 2.416***
(0.130) (0.129) (0.049) (0.126)
1992 1.901*** 1.913*** 0.144** 2.269***
(0.128) (0.127) (0.048) (0.125)
1993 1.904*** 1.915*** 0.162*** 2.287***
(0.129) (0.128) (0.047) (0.125)
1994 2.073*** 2.084*** 0.355*** 2.481***
(0.126) (0.125) (0.046) (0.124)
1995 2.256*** 2.271*** 0.578*** 2.704***
(0.126) (0.125) (0.044) (0.124)
1996 2.333*** 2.344*** 0.677""" 2.802***
(0.128) (0.127) (0.044) (0.124)
1997 2.528*** 2.537*** 0.879*** 3.004***
(0.126) (0.125) (0.042) (0.123)
The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDl, Measured by (1). (continued).
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Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
1998 2.613*** 2.624*** 0.991 *** 3.116***
(0.122) (0.121) (0.042) (0.123)
1999 2.662*** 2.673*** 1.013*** 3.137***
(0.120) (0.119) (0.042) (0.122)
2000 2.908*** 2.918*** 1.183*** 3.308***
(0.117) (0.116) (0.041) (0.122)
2001 2.596*** 2.607*** 0.852*** 2.977***
(0.118) (0.117) (0.042) (0.122)
2002 2.149*** 2.158*** 0.398*** 2.523***
(0.120) (0.119) (0.045) (0.123)
2003 2.182*** 2.191*** 0.446*** 2.571***
(0.121) (0.120) (0.045) (0.123)
2004 2.327*** 2.336*** 0.673*** 2.798***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.044) (0.123 )
2005 2.613*** 2.620*** 0.861*** 2.984***
(0.120) (0.119) (0.043) (0.123)
2006 2.676*** 2.685*** 0.943*** 3.066***
(0.119) (0.118) (0.042) (0.123)
2007 2.810*** 2.820*** 1.058*** 3.182***
(0.117) (0.116) (0.042) (0.123)
Inalpha
Constant 0.980***
(0.077)
Number of Obs. 4443 4482 4443 4482
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI, Measured by (2).
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER -0.248*** -0.293*** -0.197*** -0.237***
(0.068) (0.062) (0.055) (0.051)
ReI. Wage -0.050* -0.070*** -0.043 -0.063***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016)
1986 (0.184) (0.266) -0.802*** -1.383***
(0.191) (0.188) (0.117) (0.123)
1987 0.217 0.143 -0.534*** -1.114***
(0.164) (0.160) (0.106) (0.114)
1988 0.777*** 0.689*** -0.578* **
(0.148) (0.143) (0.101)
1989 1.339*** 1.249*** 0.485*** -0.095
(0.130) (0.123) (0.082) (0.093)
1990 1.434*** 1.347*** 0.522*** -0.059
(0.125) (0.118) (0.081) (0.092)
1991 1.660*** 1.583*** 0.640*** 0.062
(0.124) (0.117) (0.081) (0.092)
1992 1.514*** 1.440*** 0.497*** -0.081
(0.121) (0.114) (0.079) (0.091)
1993 1.654*** 1.577*** 0.616*** 0.036
(0.117) (0.109) (0.077) (0.089)
1994 1.732*** 1.654*** 0.709*** 0.129
(0.117) (0.109) (0.076) (0.088)
1995 1.939*** 1.860*** 0.920*** 0.338***
(0.117) (0.109) (0.074) (0.087)
1996 2.008*** 1.930*** 1.008*** 0.428***
(0.117) (0.108) (0.074) (0.086)
1997 2.160*** 2.076*** 1.220*** 0.638***
(0.115) (0.106) (0.072) (0.084)
1998 2.328*** 2.244*** 1.391*** 0.809***
(0.113) (0.105) (0.071) (0.083)
1999 2.556*** 2.473*** 1.550*** 0.969***
(0.111) (0.103) (0.070) (0.083)
2000 2.663*** 2.578*** 1.652*** 1.071***
(0.110) (0.102) (0.070) (0.082)
2001 2.349*** 2.263*** 1.331*** 0.747***
(0.110) (0.103) (0.071) (0.083)
2002 1.932*** 1.850*** 0.906*** 0.323***
(0.113) (0.106) (0.074) (0.086)
2003 2.054*** 1.970*** 1 nh<:*** n J1Q")***.L.vvoJ V.""TV,,"
(0.112) (0.104) (0.073) (0.084)
2004 2.237*** 2.154*** 1.240*** 0.658***
(0.110) (0.102) (0.072) (0.083)
114
The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI, Measured by (2). (continued).
Explanatory
Variables
2005
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
2.377*** 2.290***
(0.110) (0.102)
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
1.368*** 0.783***
(0.071) (0.083)
2006
2007
Inalpha
Constant
2.479***
(0.109)
2.566***
(0.109)
2.396***
(0.101)
2.481***
(0.101)
1.485***
(0.071)
1.574***
(0.070)
0.903***
(0.082)
0.992***
(0.082)
0.751***
(0.044)
Number of Obs. 15019 15309 15019 15309
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI, Measured by (3).
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER -0.597*** -0.586*** -0.489*** -0.492***
(0.117) (0.113) (0.082) (0.080)
ReI. Wage -0.086** -0.124*** -0.093* -0.134***
(0.030) (0.024) (0.039) (0.026)
1986 1.193*** 1.161*** -1.095*** 0.204
(0.235) (0.232) (0.121) (0.178)
1987 1.399*** 1.365*** -0.878*** 0.421 *
(0.229) (0.226) (0.113) (0.174)
1988 1.878*** 1.843*** -0.481*** 0.819***
(0.210) (0.207) (0.099) (0.166)
1989 2.511*** 2.476*** 0.062 1.361***
(0.192) (0.188) (0.086) (0.159)
1990 2.431*** 2.395*** 0.017 1.316***
(0.194) (0.189) (0.087) (0.160)
1991 2.490*** 2.457*** 1.299***
(0.196) (0.191) (0.161)
1992 2.196*** 2.163*** -0.212* 1.086***
(0.196) (0.191) (0.086) (0.160)
1993 2.388*** 2.355*** -0.068 1.230** *
(0.192) (0.187) (0.083) (0.159)
1994 2.430*** 2.396*** 0.003 1.301***
(0.191) (0.186) (0.082) (0.157)
1995 2.691*** 2.660*** 0.232** 1.532***
(0.189) (0.184) (0.078) (0.156)
1996 2.702*** 2.667*** 0.306*** 1.605***
(0.192) (0.187) (0.077) (0.156)
1997 2.988*** 2.951 *** 0.609*** 1.907***
(0.190) (0.184) (0.074) (0.154)
1998 3.065*** 3.029*** 0.711 *** 2.009***
(0.185) (0.180) (0.072) (0.153)
1999 3.158*** 3.121*** 0.790*** 2.088***
(0.180) (0.175) (0.072) (0.152)
2000 3.392*** 3.356*** 0.956*** 2.253***
(0.177) (0.172) (0.070) (0.151)
2001 2.975*** 2.941*** 0.579*** 1.878***
(0.180) (0.175) (0.074) (0.152)
2002 2.591*** 2.557*** 0.149 1.446***
(0.182) (0.177) (0.079) (0.154)
2003 2.708*** 2.671 *** 0.349*** 1.647***
(0.185) (0.180) (0.076) (0.153)
2004 2.808*** 2.771*** 0.459*** 1.756***
(0.184) (0.179) (0.075) (0.154)
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FOI, Measured by (3). (continued).
Explanatory
Variables
2005
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
3.002*** 2.961***
(0.182) (0.177)
Fixed Effects
0.613***
(0.073)
Poisson
Random Effects
1.910***
(0.153)
2006
2007
Inalpha
Constant
3.183***
(0.181)
3.257***
(0.178)
3.145***
(0.176)
3.221***
(0.173)
0.802***
(0.072)
0.872***
(0.071)
2.099***
(0.153)
2.170***
(0.152)
0.845***
(0.086)
Number of Obs. 3819 3880 3819 3880
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FOI, Measured by (4).
Explanatory Panel Negative Binomial Panel Poisson
Variables Fixed Effect Random Effect Fixed Effect Random Effect
ER -0.516*** -0.513*** -0.595*** -0.592***
(0.107) (0.106) (0.050) (0.049)
ReI. Wage -0.879** -0.781* 0.119 0.151
(0.334) (0.328) (0.200) (0.196)
1986 2.309*** 2.210*** 2.560***
(0.397) (0.390) (0.299)
1987 2.561 *** 2.463*** 0.263** 2.823***
(0.391) (0.385) (0.080) (0.298)
1988 3.139*** 3.042*** 0.741*** 3.301***
(0.373) (0.367) (0.074) (0.296)
1989 3.566*** 3.469*** 1.098*** 3.658***
(0.370) (0.363) (0.070) (0.295)
1990 3.648*** 3.551*** 1.162*** 3.722***
(0.370) (0.364) (0.069) (0.296)
1991 3.574*** 3.475*** 1.018*** 3.577***
(0.376) (0.370) (0.071) (0.296)
1992 3.436*** 3.336*** 0.892*** 3.452***
(0.376) (0.370) (0.070) (0.296)
1993 3.404*** 3.304*** 0.903*** 3.463***
(0.381) (0.375) (0.070) (0.296)
1994 3.531*** 3.430*** 1.075*** 3.635***
(0.382) (0.376) (0.068) (0.295)
1995 3.743*** 3.642*** 1.307*** 3.867***
(0.382) (0.375) (0.067) (0.295)
1996 3.858*** 3.756*** 1.420*** 3.980***
(0.382) (0.376) (0.066) (0.295)
1997 3.962*** 3.860*** 1.608*** 4.168***
(0.384) (0.377) (0.065) (0.294)
1998 4.095*** 3.993*** 1.740*** 4.299***
(0.383) (0.376) (0.065) (0.295)
1999 4.161 *** 4.060*** 1.756*** 4.316***
(0.380) (0.374) (0.065) (0.295)
2000 4.283*** 4.182*** 1.868*** 4.428***
(0.379) (0.373) (0.064) (0.295)
2001 4.031 *** 3.930*** 1.562*** 4.121***
(0.378) (0.372) (0.065) (0.295)
2002 3.533*** 3.432*** 1.105*** 3.664***
(0.381) (0.374) (0.068) (0.295)
2003 3.580*** ~ A"'70*** 1 1CA*** ~ ,"')11***,J • ..,.' .-;J .J. • .LU'" J.fL""t
(0.382) (0.376) (0.068) (0.295)
2004 3.692*** 3.591*** 1.414*** 3.974***
(0.383) (0.376) (0.066) (0.295)
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Horizontal FDI, Measured by (4). (continued).
Explanatory
Variables
Panel Negative Binomial
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Panel Poisson
Fixed Effect Random Effect
1.548*** 4.108***
(0.066) (0.294)
2005
2006
2007
Inalpha
Constant
3.952*** 3.853***
(0.374) (0.368)
3.956*** 3.856***
(0.375) (0.369)
4.048*** 3.949***
(0.373) (0.366)
1.601***
(0.065)
1.697***
(0.065)
4.160***
(0.294)
4.257***
(0.294)
0.485**
(0.184)
Number of Obs. 852 852 852 852
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; * *Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI, Measured by (1).
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER 0.006 -0.039 0.01 -0.015
(0.086) (0.082) (0.069) (0.066)
ReI. Wage -0.186 -0.279*** 0.254 -0.280**
(0.158) (0.084) (0.185) (0.103)
1986 -2.920*** -2.901*** (0.388) -3.727***
(0.717) (0.716) (0.764) (0.591)
1987 -1.851*** -1.822*** 0.301 -3.035***
(0.429) (0.427) (0.646) (0.430)
1988 -2.377*** -2.342*** -3.335***
(0.594) (0.592) (0.519)
1989 -1.086*** -1.051*** 1.435** -1.886***
(0.304) (0.300) (0.542) (0.253)
1990 -1.052*** -1.024** 1.453** -1.880***
(0.318) (0.314) (0.550) (0.267)
1991 -0.221 -0.19 2.290*** -1.041***
(0.279) (0.275) (0.530) (0.227)
1992 -0.471 -0.426 2.229*** -1.081***
(0.279) (0.274) (0.524) (0.218)
1993 0.2 0.234 2.906*** -0.407*
(0.223) (0.216) (0.510) (0.181)
1994 0.563** 0.595** 3.285*** -0.03
(0.211) (0.204) (0.507) (0.172)
1995 0.834*** 0.876*** 3.352*** 0.045
(0.214) (0.205) (0.509) (0.184)
1996 0.925*** 0.970*** 3.552*** 0.246
(0.220) (0.211) (0.508) (0.179)
1997 1.095*** 1.127*** 3.811*** 0.503**
(0.197) (0.188) (0.505) (0.167)
1998 1.481*** 1.517*** 4.111 *** 0.803***
(0.191) (0.182) (0.504) (0.165)
1999 1.551*** 1.591*** 4.196*** 0.888***
(0.206) (0.196) (0.504) (0.171)
2000 1.473*** 1.506*** 4.157*** 0.847***
(0.193) (0.184) (0.504) (0.165)
2001 1.380*** 1.405*** 4.017*** 0.704***
(0.187) (0.178) (0.504) (0.162)
2002 0.975*** 1.002*** 3.736*** 0.425**
(0.197) (0.189) (0.505) (0.164)
2003 1.300*** 1.323*** 4.072*** 0.760***
(0.190) (0.182) (0.503) (0.159)
2004 1.646*** 1.674*** 4.384*** 1.075***
(0.187) (0.178) (0.503) (0.158)
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI, Measured by (1). (continued).
Expla natory
Variables
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
1.619*** 1.645***
(0.190) (0.182)
1.643*** 1.662***
2005
2006
2007
Inalpha
Constant
(0.196)
1.293***
(0.211)
(0.188)
1.304***
(0.204)
4.408*** 1.096***
(0.503) (0.157)
4.410*** 1.102***
(0.503) (0.158)
4.202*** 0.888***
(0.506) (0.165)
0.707***
(0.096)
Number of Obs. 3089 3203 3089 3203
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FOI, Measured by (2).
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER -0.074 -0.107* -0.179*** -0.186***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.035) (0.033)
ReI. Wage -0.031* -0.065*** -0.042** -0.071***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
1986 -0.285* -0.278* -1.351*** -0.530***
(0.130) (0.129) (0.065) (0.085)
1987 0.133 0.139 -1.001*** -0.180*
(0.115 ) (0.113) (0.056) (0.080)
1988 0.699*** 0.701 *** -0.426*** 0.396***
(0.101) (0.099) (0.047) (0.074)
1989 1.028*** 1.024*** -0.140** 0.681 ***
(0.093) (0.091) (0.043) (0.071)
1990 1.182*** 1.179*** -0.034 0.787***
(0.089) (0.087) (0.042) (0.070)
1991 1.466*** 1.471*** 0.822***
(0.087) (0.085) (0.071)
1992 1.361*** 1.368*** -0.112** 0.710***
(0.084) (0.082) (0.041) (0.070)
1993 1.392*** 1.394*** -0.082* 0.738***
(0.082) (0.080) (0.040) (0.070)
1994 1.534*** 1.537*** 0.121 ** 0.942***
(0.082) (0.080) (0.038) (0.069)
1995 1.672*** 1.676*** 0.286*** 1.106***
(0.082) (0.080) (0.037) (0.069)
1996 1.706*** 1.709*** 0.360*** 1.181***
(0.082) (0.080) (0.037) (0.068)
1997 1.833*** 1.830*** 0.510*** 1.329 ***
(0.080) (0.078) (0.036) (0.068)
1998 2.056*** 2.055*** 0.700*** 1.520***
(0.078) (0.076) (0.035) (0.067)
1999 2.165*** 2.164*** 0.763*** 1.583***
(0.078) (0.075) (0.035) (0.067)
2000 2.366*** 2.364*** 0.938*** 1.757***
(0.076) (0.074) (0.034) (0.067)
2001 2.163*** 2.161*** 0.665*** 1.483***
(0.076) (0.074) (0.035) (0.067)
2002 1.629*** 1.629*** 0.157*** 0.976***
(0.078) (0.076) (0.038) (0.069)
2003 1.672*** 1 &::71 *** " 1 {\'")*** 1,,11*.*.L.V/.L V.J.::JL .l.VJ.J.
(0.078) (0.076) (0.038) (0.068)
2004 1.885*** 1.883*** 0.463*** 1.282***
(0.077) (0.075) (0.036) (0.067)
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI, Measured by (2). (continued).
Explanatory
Variables
2005
2006
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
2.144*** 2.140***
(0.076) (0.073)
2.125*** 2.123***
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
0.658*** 1.475***
(0.035) (0.067)
0.671 *** 1.490***
2007
Inalpha
Constant
(0.076)
2.249***
(0.075)
(0.074)
2.248***
(0.073)
(0.035)
0.788***
(0.035)
(0.067)
1.607***
(0.067)
0.917***
(0.039)
Number of Obs. 17368 17663 17368 17663
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
123
The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDl, Measured by (3).
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER 0.037 -0.021 0.089 0.058
(0.102) (0.095) (0.084) (0.078)
ReI. Wage 0.052 -0.202* 0.365 -0.213
(0.240) (0.098) (0.212) (0.123)
1986 -3.439*** -3.413*** -3.495*** -4.848***
(1.011) (1.009) (1.020) (1.009)
1987 -2.352*** -2.315*** -2.412*** -3.764***
(0.599) (0.596) (0.610) (0.595)
1988 -2.199*** -2.154*** -2.041*** -3.391***
(0.601) (0.597) (0.537) (0.522)
1989 -1.367*** -1.320*** -1.084** -2.421***
(0.377) (0.370) (0.332) (0.310)
1990 -1.294*** -1.259** -1.032** -2.381***
(0.389) (0.383) (0.350) (0.325)
1991 -0.207 -0.172 ~1.345***
(0.310) (0.302) (0.253)
1992 -0.425 -0.367 0.004 -1.321***
(0.310) (0.300) (0.260) (0.239)
1993 0.088 0.132 0.448 -0.880***
(0.260) (0.248) (0.231) (0.207)
1994 0.515* 0.558* 0.899*** -0.430*
(0.242) (0.229) (0.221) (0.193)
1995 0.684** 0.739** 0.906*** -0.414*
(0.252) (0.238) (0.226) (0.211)
1996 0.808** 0.868*** 1.106*** -0.213
(0.257) (0.243) (0.220) (0.204)
1997 0.923*** 0.963*** 1.366*** 0.043
(0.235) (0.220) (0.212) (0.188)
1998 1.402*** 1.449*** 1.719*** 0.398*
(0.224) (0.210) (0.208) (0.185)
1999 1.439** * 1.486*** 1.789*** 0.467*
(0.243) (0.228) (0.208) (0.192)
2000 1.403*** 1.443*** 1.807*** 0.483**
(0.228) (0.214) (0.207) (0.185)
2001 1.250*** 1.282*** 1.583*** 0.255
(0.220) (0.206) (0.209) (0.182)
2002 0.812*** 0.847*** 1.278*** -0.048
(0.234) (0.221) (0.212) (0.185)
2003 1.118*** 1 1117*** 1 C"')C'*** n ,nn.L. • .L."'TI .l..U.l..J V.£::1::1
(0.228) (0.215) (0.208) (0.179)
2004 1.487*** 1.522*** 1.916*** 0.592***
(0.222) (0.208) (0.205) (0.176)
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI, Measured by (3). (continued).
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
1.549** * 1.580** *
(0.223) (0.209)
1.520*** 1.543***
2005
2006
2007
Inalpha
Constant
(0.233)
1.168***
(0.251)
(0.219)
1.177***
(0.240)
2.011 *** 0.683***
(0.204) (0.175)
2.035*** 0.711***
(0.207) (0.176)
1.744*** 0.412*
(0.219) (0.187)
0.690***
(0.102)
Number of
Obs. 2830 2968 2830 2968
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI, Measured by (4).
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER 0.147 0.08 0.264* 0.236*
(0.125) (0.121) (0.105) (0.101)
ReI. Wage 1.765** 1.265* 5.748*** 3.738***
(0.662) (0.546) (0.883) (0.747)
1986 -3.198** -3.081** 0.027 -3.520* **
(1.015) (1.014) (1.001) (0.744)
1987 -1.707*** -1.564** 0.873 -2.668***
(0.498) (0.494) (0.837) (0.509)
1988 -2.536*** -2.380** -3.536***
(0.744) (0.741) (0.750)
1989 -1.757*** -1.579*** 1.089 -2.335* **
(0.480) (0.473) (0.762) (0.395)
1990 -0.917* -0.775* 1.975** -1.548***
(0.390) (0.386) (0.750) (0.351)
1991 -0.738 -0.588 1.994** -1.520***
(0.387) (0.384) (0.750) (0.359)
1992 -1.082** -0.894* 1.930** -1.475***
(0.411) (0.402) (0.733) (0.338)
1993 -0.277 -0.094 2.575*** -0.852**
(0.337) (0.326) (0.720) (0.305)
1994 -0.007 0.181 2.853*** -0.58
(0.328) (0.315) (0.718) (0.297)
1995 0.15 0.352 2.892*** -0.523
(0.334) (0.320) (0.718) (0.307)
1996 0.431 0.632* 3.235*** -0.197
(0.333) (0.319) (0.716) (0.303)
1997 0.338 0.523 3.258*** -0.17
(0.317) (0.304) (0.715) (0.292)
1998 0.887** 1.073*** 3.686*** 0.258
(0.304) (0.291) (0.713) (0.286)
1999 1.077*** 1.276*** 3.853*** 0.417
(0.323) (0.310) (0.712) (0.293)
2000 0.831 ** 1.024*** 3.570*** 0.14
(0.313) (0.300) (0.713) (0.292)
2001 0.651 * 0.842** 3.444*** 0.023
(0.312) (0.298) (0.714) (0.290)
2002 0.151 0.344 2.989*** -0.433
(0.327) (0.313) (0.716) (0.296)
"'")f'\f'\j
" e" 0.783** ':l AC"7*** " ('\..., 0LVVJ V.~:J .::J.""'tUI u.u""'to
(0.316) (0.301) (0.714) (0.288)
2004 0.873** 1.073*** 3.744*** 0.335
(0.319) (0.303) (0.713) (0.290)
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDl, Measured by (4). (continued).
Explanatory
Variables
2005
2006
2007
Inalpha
Constant
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects
0.696* 0.905**
(0.330) (0.313)
0.732* 0.936**
(0.333) (0.317)
0.592 0.778*
(0.342) (0.327)
Poisson
Fixed Effects Random Effects
3.639*** 0.234
(0.713) (0.292)
3.776*** 0.385
(0.713) (0.291)
3.662*** 0.262
(0.716) (0.293)
0.506**
(0.189)
Number of Obs. 877 877 877 877
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI, Measured by (1) and Excluding Indonesia,
Malaysia and Philippines.
Explanatory Negative Binomial Poisson
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
ER 0.229 0.188 0.248** 0.227**
(0.121) (0.114) (0.092) (0.087)
ReI. Wage -0.087 -0.237* 0.32 -0.245
(0.209) (0.104) (0.222) (0.136)
1986 -3.285** -3.270** -1.880* -3.749***
(1.011) (1.009) (0.761) (0.726)
1987 -2.682*** -2.658*** -1.925* -3.790***
(0.727) (0.724) (0.760) (0.727)
1988 -15.359 -28.786 -16.056 -21.806
(396.026) (331000.000) (818.203) (5718.801)
1989 -1.458*** -1.426*** -0.145 -1.982***
(0.400) (0.393) (0.369) (0.305)
1990 -2.185*** -2.163*** -0.68 -2.539***
(0.600) (0.596) (0.469) (0.415)
1991 -1.170** -1.142** -1.852***
(0.421) (0.415) (0.333)
1992 -0.803* -0.761* 0.615 -1.213***
(0.327) (0.316) (0.321) (0.252)
1993 -0.339 -0.307 1.176*** -0.655**
(0.303) (0.292) (0.303) (0.229)
1994 0.149 0.179 1.615*** -0.219
(0.267) (0.255) (0.294) (0.213)
1995 0.461 0.505* 1.628*** -0.197
(0.270) (0.254) (0.296) (0.229)
1996 0.406 0.452 1.740*** -0.086
(0.294) (0.279) (0.296) (0.230)
1997 0.647* 0.682** 2.096*** 0.269
(0.264) (0.249) (0.289) (0.214)
1998 1.198*** 1.231*** 2.486*** 0.658**
(0.244) (0.230) (0.285) (0.208)
1999 1.254*** 1.282*** 2.548*** 0.721 ***
(0.249) (0.235 ) (0.285) (0.210)
2000 1.242*** 1.274*** 2.539*** 0.714***
(0.240) (0.225) (0.285) (0.207)
2001 1.183*** 1.211*** 2.430*** 0.604**
(0.234) (0.220) (0.285) (0.204)
2002 0.891 *** 0.919*** 2.222 *** 0.397
(0.239) {O.225) (0.287) (0.204)
2003 1.144*** 1.167*** 2.519*** 0.695***
(0.235) (0.222) (0.285) (0.200)
2004 1.459*** 1.488*** 2.831*** 1.009***
(0.237) (0.222) (0.283) (0.199)
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The Exchange Rate Effect on Vertical FDI, Measured by (1) and Excluding Indonesia,
Malaysia and Philippines. (continued).
Explanatory
Variables
Negative Binomial
Fixed Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects
Poisson
Random Effects
1.371*** 1.400***
(0.242) (0.226)
1.533*** 1.558***
(0.241) (0.226)
1.156*** 1.173***
2005
2006
2007
Inalpha
Constant
(0.267) (0.253)
2.815***
(0.283)
2.892***
(0.283)
2.699***
(0.290)
0.992***
(0.198)
1.071***
(0.197)
0.876***
(0.207)
0.727***
(0.120)
Number of Obs. 1983 2002 1983 2002
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level;
***Significant at the 0.1% level.
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APPENDIXC
ESTIMATION RESULTS IN CHAPTER III
The complete estimation results on the effect of the expected exchange rate
and the exchange rate effect on the different types of FDI in the third chapter are
available upon request.
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